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BLENDED SENTENCING: A GOOD IDEA
FOR JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS?
KRISTIN L. CABALLERO*
In 1997, two police officers sodomized a male with a broomstick
after he was arrested.1 A judge sentenced one officer to jail for
thirty years2 after he pled guilty to conspiracy to deprive a
person of his civil rights, deprivation of civil rights, assault,
sexual assault, and witness tampering. 3 The second officer
received five years in jail after he pled guilty to perjury.4 Six
years later, a similar crime took place when a high school football
team from Mepham, Long Island attended football camp in
Pennsylvania. 5 Senior team members sodomized three junior
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2005; B.S. Biochemistry,
cum laude, Manhattan College, May 2002. The author would like to thank Professor
Elaine Chiu and the staff of the Journal of Legal Commentary for all of their time and
assistance.
1 See United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd in part, 224
F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000). Abner Louima and Justin Volpe, a New York City police officer,
were involved in an altercation outside a nightclub in Brooklyn. Id. at 79. After Louima
was arrested and taken back to the precinct, he was led to a bathroom where Volpe forced
a broomstick approximately six inches up Louima's rectum. Id. at 80.
2 See United States v. Volpe, 224 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that district court
judge did not err in sentencing defendant to thirty years in prison).
3 See Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (listing six of twelve counts of indictment to which
Volpe pled guilty).
4 See United v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2002). In earlier trials, Charles
Schwarz was found guilty of conspiring to violate and violating Louima's civil rights as
well as conspiracy to obstruct a grand jury proceeding. Id. On appeal, Schwarz's
conviction to obstruct justice was overturned and his civil rights convictions were vacated
and remanded. Id. at 81.The night before Schwarz's retrial, a judge sentenced Schwarz to
five years in prison in return for his guilty plea. See also William Glaberson, On the Eve of
Trial, Ex-Officer Agrees to Perjury Terms in Louima Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, at
1.
5 See Ellis Henican, Sex Assault Case More than Hijinks, NEWSDAY (New York), Sept.
14, 2003, at A8 (referencing Abner Louima's case when discussing alleged sexual abuse
and sodomy that took place at Pennsylvania football camp); see also Paul Vitello, Missing
in Action: Leaders, NEWSDAY (New York), May 4, 2004, at A08 (noting similarity between
the way in which members of the 70th precinct of the New York City Police Department
raped Abner Louima with a broomstick and the way several members of the Mepham
High School football team tortured and humiliated their younger teammates); Grant
Wahl & L. Jon Wertheim, A Rite Gone Terribly Wrong, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 22,
2003 at 68 (observing the resemblance between the Mepham case to that of Abner
Louima, who was sodomized by a police officer in 1997).
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team members numerous times with broomsticks, golf balls, and
pine cones during a "hazing."6 This time, the offenders' sentences
were vastly different. One defendant was sentenced to a military
boot camp, 7 the second defendant was sent to a residential
treatment center in Pennsylvania to undergo further testing and
treatment,8 while the third defendant received probation. 9
While the circumstances surrounding the two crimes and the
injuries produced were very different, the ultimate crime was the
same.10 Abner Louima suffered serious physical injuries to his
bladder and rectum that required surgery,'" while the Mepham
6 See Karla Schuster & Keiko Morris, How the Attacks and Fear Escalated; Mepham
Court Documents Detail Days of Brutality, Terror, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 18, 2003, at
A3 (detailing series of events and sexual assaults that occurred during Mepham High
School football team's hazing of younger players). See generally Melissa Dixon, Chalk
Talk: Hazing in High Schools: Ending the Hidden Tradition, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 357, 358
(2001) (listing physical activities considered hazing to include "beating, whipping,
branding, electronic shock, placing harmful substances on the body, confinement in small
places, and deprivation of sleep, food, or drink").
7 See Brian Harmon, Hazers Off Easy, 4 Months for LI. Grid Predators, DAILY NEWS,
Jan. 15, 2004, at 4 (noting that seventeen year old Phil Sofia was sentenced to boot camp
for four months, after which time a judge will reevaluate Sofia to see if his sentence
should be extended); see also Patrick Healy, Report Says Hazing Culture Led to Attacks on
Three Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, at B1 (stating that one of the defendants was sentenced to boot
camp); Karla Schuster & Keiko Morris, Players Learn Their Fate; 2 Mepham Teens Sent to
Juvenile Facilities; 3d Gets Probation, NEWSDAY (New York), at A03 (observing that Phil
Sofia, the oldest defendant, received the harshest punishment of at least four months in a
wilderness boot camp).
8 See Harmon, supra note 7, at 4 (stating that defendant, Ken Carney, will be sent to
juvenile detention center); see also Patrick Healy, Confinement for 2 Athletes in Sex Abuse
of Teammates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at B6 (noting that Phil Sofia was sentenced to
residential treatment center); Laura Williams, The Longest Yard Hazing - Scarred High
School Returns to Gridiron, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 31, 2004 at 3 (reporting that
Ken Carney, named as ringleader in assaults, remains in Pennsylvania treatment
facility).
9 See Erin Calabrese, Judge Slams Mepham Hazers, N.Y. POST, Jan. 15, 2004, at 11
(observing that sixteen-year-old Tom Diasparra was sentenced to probation after making
deal with prosecutors); see also Brian Harmon, High School Football Players Sent to
Juvenile Facilities for Hazing, DAILY NEWS (New York), Jan. 15, 2004 (stating that, after
making deal with prosecutor, Tom Diasparra received probation and was freed); Healy,
supra note 8, at B6 (observing that Tom Diasparra can return to Bellmore-Merrick
community, but will not be allowed to return to Mepham High School);
10 See Paul Vitello, Searching for Grown-Ups, NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 14, 2003,
at A4 (observing that while Mepham incident may be referred to as "hazing," it is
essentially "brutal anal assault with broomsticks and other objects - the kind of violence
that sent Abner Louima's attackers to prison for a long time."); see also Patrick Healy,
Coach on LI. Says He Knew of No Hazing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003 at B5 (quoting head
coach of Mepham High School's football team, Kevin McElroy, who characterized
allegations as "vicious criminal acts."); Steve Jacobson, Mepham: Can Any Good Come of
It?, NEWSDAY (New York), Jan. 18, 2004, at B31 (noting that had victims been girls or
younger boys, the crime would have correctly been identified as rape).
11 See United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (79 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd in part,
appeal dismissed, 224 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that Louima had internal injuries
2005] BLENDED SENTENCING
victims' physical injuries were not as severe. 12 Yet, both Louima
and the younger Mepham team members were all victims of
sodomy.13 Why then, was there such a disparity in sentencing for
seemingly similar crimes? The simple answer is that the
perpetrators in the hazing incident were all under the age of
eighteen and prosecuted as juveniles.14 Under Pennsylvania
state law, the minors could have been charged as adults, which
would have resulted in much harsher sentences.15 While the
prosecutor petitioned the judge to move the juvenile's cases to
adult court, the judge denied the prosecutor's request.16
Both the decision to keep the teenagers in juvenile court and
the juvenile sentences imposed led to strong reactions from
people inside and outside the community.17 While some people
did support the judge,' 8 the vast majority seemed to be highly
that required doctors to repair perforations to his bladder and rectum as well as to
perform colostomy and cystostomy procedures).
12 See Bruce Lambert, Long Island Coaches Say They Tried to Prevent Student
Hazing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003, at B8 (observing that three Mepham victims required
medical treatment for their injuries).
13 See Vitello, supra note 10, at A4 (comparing Abner Louima and Mepham hazing
incident).
14 See Karla Schuster, Staying in Youth Court; Pennsylvania Judge Ignores Public
Pleas in Ruling in Mepham Case, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 13, 2003, at A3 (affirming
that Pennsylvania judge refused to move the Mepham cases to adult court and instead
kept all of the defendants' cases in juvenile courts).
15 See, e.g., 42 Pa. C.S. § 6302 (2004) (listing aggravating circumstances that must be
present before juvenile may be charged as an adult); 1 P.L.E. MINORS § 34 (2004)
(stating that party objecting to juvenile court's jurisdiction bears burden of showing that
provisions of juvenile act are inappropriate); see also Keiko Morris & Karla Schuster, Kids
or Adults? That is Question; DA to Say Where he Wants to Try Mepham Players, NEWSDAY
(New York), Oct. 5, 2003, at A3 (noting that while District Attorney sought to have case
transferred to adult court, such transfers are rare in Pennsylvania).
16 See Patrick Healy, L. I. Athletes Are Said to Face Juvenile Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2003, at B1 (observing Pennsylvania judge's ruling that juveniles will not be
prosecuted as adults); see also Morris & Schuster, supra note 15, at A3 (stating that in
2001 fewer than 1% of all cases beginning in Pennsylvania juvenile courts were
transferred to adult system); Schuster, supra note 14, at A3 (noting that after five-hour
hearing, judge declined to transfer cases).
17 See Karla Schuster & Keiko Morris, 'Appalled and Sickened" Grand Jury
Condemns Lack of Responsibility, Takes All Parties to Task for Handling of Attacks at Pa.
Football Camp, NEWSDAY (New York), Mar. 11, 2004, at A02 (commenting on grand jury
report from Pennsylvania jury in Mepham case which criticized school district,
Pennsylvania justice system, and judge for failing the victims); see also Frank Eltman,
Mepham Season Ends After Hazing; Long Island Incident Thought One of the Worst in the
Nation, TIMES UNION (Albany), Oct. 4, 2003, at C5 (observing that over 700 people from
community attended meeting at high school regarding hazing incident). See generally
Schuster, supra note 14, at A3 (discussing public outcry at judge's decision to try
defendants in juvenile court).
18 See generally Patrick Healy, Three Athletes to be Charged in Abuse Case, Police
Say, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003, at BI (highlighting division among community); see also
Schuster & Morris, supra note 17, at A2 (expressing grand jury's belief that judges
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dissatisfied with the outcome. 19 This majority believed that the
defendants were let off too easy and that harsher punishments
should have been imposed.20
This reaction to the Mepham hazing incident illustrates that
there may be flaws in the way our current juvenile court system
is handling juvenile sex offenders. Specifically, there is
dissatisfaction with both our current juvenile proceedings and
the punishments imposed. The issue remaining is, if our current
juvenile court system is ineffective in treating juvenile sex
offenders, what then would be the most effective means to deal
with juvenile sex offenders? 21 On one end of the spectrum, there
are those who argue that the juvenile court system is completely
inadequate for dealing with juvenile sex offenders and thus
juvenile sex offenders should not even be in the juvenile court
system to begin with.22 A less extreme argument is that while
our current juvenile court system is not effectively handling
juvenile sex offenders, proper changes and reformations to our
current system will then enable the system to appropriately
handle juvenile sex offenders. 23
sentencing was limited by juvenile court proceedings). See generally Eltman, supra note
17, at C5 (observing communities' interest in outcome of hazing incident).
19 See Healy, supra note 16, at B1 (quoting victim's aunt as stating 'These are
horrendous crimes. How can any of them be tried as juveniles? It's disgusting. They're
going to be laughing all the way back to Long Island."); see also; Schuster & Morris, supra
note 17, at A2 (criticizing sentences); Paul Vitello, Omission of Their Guilt, NEWSDAY
(New York), Jan.15, 2004, at A02 (describing defendant's sentences as "gifts").
20 See Robert J. Conway, Report Decries Lack of Accountability, NEWSDAY (New
York), Mar. 11, 2004, at A60 (stating that Grand Jury report expressed strong
dissatisfaction with how legal system handled Mepham hazing case, specifically noting
that Grand Jury was "sickened and appalled by the crimes committed" and was "incensed
that these criminals were not tried as. adults"); see also, Schuster & Morris, supra note 17,
at A2 (discussing grand jury's belief that harsher sentences should have been imposed).
21 This note will use the terms juvenile, child, and youth interchangeably to refer to
someone under the age of eighteen.
22 See Michael Kennedy Burke, This Old Court: Abolitionists Once Again Line Up the
Wrecking Ball on the Juvenile Court When All It Needs is a Few Minor Alterations, 26 U.
TOL. L. REV. 1027, 1028-31 (1995) (outlining arguments of those in favor of abolishing
juvenile court system, including theory that juvenile court is "soft" on juvenile offenders);
see also Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1083, 1105-06 (1991)
(stating that abolition of juvenile system is more in line with societies' current view, away
from rehabilitating convicted criminal towards retribution). See generally Robert 0.
Dawson, Criminal Law Symposium: Future Trends in Criminal Procedure: The Future of
Juvenile Justice: Is it Time to Abolish the System?, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 136,
137-40 (1990) (discussing growing support of abolishment of juvenile court system).
23 See Burke, supra note 22, at 1028-31 (arguing that by recognizing juveniles' due
process rights, Court has diminished ability of juvenile courts to serve their social
purpose, thus creating a system that is too similar to adult criminal system). See
generally Ainsworth, supra note 22, at 1085 (stating that changing social views on
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This note proposes that because juvenile sex offenders commit
very harmful and injurious crimes, certain reforms must be made
to our juvenile court system to adequately handle such juvenile
sex offenders. First, there should be either a statutory exclusion
or a mandatory judicial waiver mandating that juveniles sixteen
years and older who are charged with a sexual offense must be
prosecuted as adults in criminal court. Additionally, once in
criminal court, the judge must impose either a blended sentence
or an adult sentence. This note will examine juvenile sex
offenders and will then describe how the implementation of a
blended sentence statute provides the most adequate remedy.
Part I of this note will give a brief history of the establishment
and evolution of the juvenile court system. Part II will focus on
the unique problems and issues raised by juvenile sex offenders.
Part III will then explain the current status of the juvenile court
system. Specifically, this note will outline the various waiver
provisions and blended sentencing statutes that allow for adult
treatment of exceptional juvenile matters. Finally, this note will
explain why a statutory exclusion or mandatory judicial waiver,
combined with a blended sentencing statute, will provide for the
most effective way to deal with juvenile sex offenders.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Juvenile Justice System
Prior to the establishment of separate juvenile courts, states
prosecuted juveniles in a manner similar to adult prosecutions. 24
In 1899, the first juvenile court was created in Cook County,
childhood and cost of maintaining juvenile system mandate abolition of juvenile court
system); Susan K. Knipps, What is a "Fair" Response to Juvenile Crime?, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 455, 460-62 (1993) (arguing that increased prosecution of juveniles in adult
courts will not decrease juvenile crime).
24 See David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Criminal Law: "Owing to the Extreme
Youth of the Accused" The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 641, 645-46 (2002) (noting that changes to juvenile prosecutions began to
emerge in nineteenth century); see also Ainsworth, supra note 22, at 1097 ("Progressives
fashioned a discrete juvenile justice system premised upon the belief that, like other
children, adolescents are not morally accountable for their behavior"); Barry C. Feld, The
Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 693-94 (1991) (arguing that
nineteenth century brought new interpretation of childhood that was inconsistent with
adult prosecution).
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Illinois.25 The creation of juvenile courts was part of the
Progressive Era reform. 26 The emerging view was that juvenile
criminals were different from adult criminals and should thus be
treated differently. 27 The juvenile court system was created to be
a venue specially designed to deal with children's special needs
and to provide treatment and rehabilitation to juveniles. 28 The
underlying premise was the belief that children are malleable
and are capable of being reformed. 29 Under the concept of "parens
25 See Ira M. Schwartz, et al., Nine Lives and Then Some: Why the Juvenile Court
Does Not Roll Over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 535 (1998) (noting that Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of 1899 created nation's first juvenile court); see also JUVENILE
JUSTICE FYI available at http://www.juvenilejusticefyi.comlhistory-of.juvenillejustice
justice.html (last visited Sep. 12, 2004) (stating that juvenile justice system was created
in late 1800's to reform U.S. policies regarding juvenile offenders). See generally
Ainsworth, supra note 22, at 1097 (stating that Illinois passed Juvenile Court Act in
1899).
26 See Deborah L. Mills, United States v. Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the
Juvenile Court System from Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45 DE PAUL L. REV. 903, 905-
07 (1996) (noting that during late nineteenth century, United States began to shift from
rural, agrarian society to urban industrialized society, causing new problems to emerge as
result of industrialization and modernization, including poverty, crime, urban ghettos,
and lack of social services, and also leading to reform movement, known as Progressive
reform, to address society's new problems, including addressing children's moral and
social development); see also Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Sentence Blending and the Promise
of Rehabilitation: Bringing the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
259, 264-65 (1999) (noting that the Progressive Era movement for reform of juvenile court
system was premised on protecting and rehabilitating youths); Feld, supra note 24, at
693-94 (stating nineteenth century changing views of children prompted reformation of
juvenile prosecution).
27 See Adam D. Kamenstein, The Inner-Morality of Juvenile Justice: The Case for
Consistency and Legality, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 2105, 2111-12 (1997) (observing that
children were criminals because they lacked proper moral structure and instruction that
non-criminal child had received); see also Feld, supra note 24, at 693-94 (arguing that
view that childhood and adolescence were developmental stages emerged in nineteenth
century); Mills, supra note 26, at 903, 907 (suggesting that ideological shifts in later part
of nineteenth century concerned causes underlying juvenile crime).
28 See Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America's
"Juvenile Injustice System," 22 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 909-11 (1995) (discussing idea that
children juvenile delinquency was like a "disease" and juvenile court would prescribe
proper treatment to rehabilitate and cure delinquent of "disease"); see also Janet E.
Ainsworth, Symposium-Struggling for a Future: Juvenile Violence, Juvenile Justice:
Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 927, 927 (1995) (discussing juvenile courts goal to rehabilitate juvenile offenders
and prevent future criminality); Korine L. Larsen, With Liberty and Juvenile Justice for
All: Extending the Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
835, 841 (1994) (discussing juvenile offenders being placed in system of rehabilitation).
29 See Larsen, supra note 28, at 841 (stating that juvenile behavior is reflection of
environment and being placed in rehabilitative atmosphere would reform offending
behavior); Schwartz, supra note 25, at 535 (recognizing juvenile courts were founded on
belief that children are "dependent on adults; are developing emotionally, morally, and
cognitively, and therefore, are psychologically impressionable and behaviorally malleable;
and have different, less competent, levels of understanding and collateral mental function
that adults"); Smallheer, supra note 26, at 264 (arguing children are more receptive to
rehabilitation).
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patriae,"30 the state was deemed to play the role of the parent.31
As a "parent," the state assumed the power and authority to help
rehabilitate the child offender. 32 The overall focus of the juvenile
court system was rehabilitation. 33 By the 1940's, every state had
established a juvenile court system.34
B. Emerging Problems with the Juvenile Court System
During the 1960's and 1970's, dissatisfaction with the juvenile
court system began to grow. 35 Juvenile courts were overwhelmed
30 Black's law dictionary defines parens patriae as "the state regarded as a sovereign;
the state in its capacity as provider of protection for those unable to care for themselves."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (7th ed. 1999). See Barbara Margaret Farrell,
Pennsylvania's Treatment of Children Who Commit Murder: Criminal Punishment Has
Not Replaced Parens Patriae, 98 DICK. L. REV. 739, 743 (1994), discussing state's power to
act as parental figure to confined children). See also Larsen, supra note 28, at 841, stating
that parens patriae allows state to be surrogate parent.
31 See United States v. Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966) (noting that in juvenile
proceeding, state is parens patriae and not prosecuting attorney and judge); see also
Chauncey E. Brummer, Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction: The Best of Both Worlds?, 54
ARK. L. REV. 777, 784-85, (2002) (formulating basis of juvenile court on idea that state
acts as "surrogate parent to wayward children"); Larsen, supra note 28, at 841 (stating
parens patriae allows state to play role of parent in rehabilitating juvenile offenders). See
generally Solomon J. Greene, Note, Vicious Streets: The Crisis of Industrial City and
Invention of Juvenile Justice, 15 Yale J.L. & Human 135, 140-43 (2003) (discussing
history and development of parens patriae doctrine).
32 See Larsen, supra note 28, at 841 (explaining the state, assuming the role of
surrogate parent, could provide the necessary help to rehabilitate offending children);
Schwartz supra note 25, at 535-36 (noting juvenile court plays a dual role as a
disciplinarian who punishes the child and as a parent who can supervise, treat and
rehabilitate the child); Simon Singer, Criminal and Teen Courts as Loosely Coupled
Systems of Juvenile Justice, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 510 (1998) (explaining that as
parent, juvenile courts have legal authority to coordinate various treatments, including
residential placements and probation, to help reform the juvenile delinquent).
33 See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 71 (1997)
(discussing rehabilitation as aim of juvenile court system); see also Lynda E. Frost &
Adrienne E. Volenick, The Ethical Perils of Representing the Juvenile Defendant Who May
Be Incompetent, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 327, 332 (2004) (noting that juvenile court
originally focused on rehabilitation and best interests of the child); Larsen, supra note 28,
at 841 (discussing treatment, and not punishment as solution to altering juvenile
offending behavior).
34 See Ainsworth, supra note 22, at 1083 (stating that all fifty states and District of
Columbia have juvenile courts); see also Thomas F. Geraghty & Steven A. Drizin, The
Debate Over the Future of Juvenile Courts: Can We Reach Consensus?, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 n.4 (1997) (stating that Wyoming was last state to create juvenile court
in 1945); Helen B. Greenwald, Capital Punishment for Minors: An Eighth Amendment
Analysis, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1471, 1476 (1983) (stating all fifty states have
enacted juvenile court acts).
35 See Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine That Arrived at the Wrong Station: How to
get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 409 (1999) (noting
complaints on juvenile court system's treatment of juveniles); see also Larsen, supra note
28, at 843 (discussing surge of critics of juvenile court system after World War II); Hon.
W. Don Reader, They Grow Up So Fast: When Juvenile Commit Adult Crimes: The Laws
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with staggering amounts of cases. 36 The courts were not able to
adjudicate juvenile claims properly and effectively. 37
Additionally, there was dissatisfaction with the sentences. 38
Juvenile offenders were either given a slap on the wrist or they
were sent to large juvenile institutions that were not equipped to
effectively handle the juvenile's problems. 39  In sum, the
foundational goal of rehabilitation was not being met.
The inadequacies of the juvenile system came to light in 1966
when Kent v. United States 40 was decided. Sixteen-year old
Morris Kent was a prior juvenile offender who was arrested in
1961 for housebreaking, robbery, and rape.41 The juvenile court
judge, without conducting a hearing, waived jurisdiction and
transferred Kent's case to the U.S. District Court for the District
Court of Columbia.42 At trial, the jury found Kent guilty on six
counts of housebreaking and robbery. 43 Kent was sentenced to a
of Unintended Results, 29 AKRON L. REV. 477, 480 (1996) (discussing growing number of
juvenile court system critics after 1950's increase in juvenile drug use and violence).
36 See Reader, supra note 35, at 480 (noting increase in juvenile drug use and violent
youth gangs beginning in 1950's); see also Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the
Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 371, 373 (1998) (noting increase in juvenile crime); Larsen, supra note 28,
at 846 (noting increase in serious crime rate among juveniles).
37 See Klein, supra note 36, at 377-78 (arguing that judges were treating all juvenile
offenders similarly, regardless of nature of their crime, prior history, or situation); see also
Feld, supra note 33, at 81 (observing questions raised regarding fairness in sentencing);
Reader, supra note 35, at 480 (noting attacks regarding sentencing in juvenile court).
38 See Feld, supra note 33, at 81 (opining that sentences issued by juvenile courts may
not be fair); see also Klein, supra note 36, at 374 (discussing court leniency with serious
offenders and harsh sentences for minor offenders); Reader, supra note 35, at 480
(discussing critical attacks made on juvenile court sentences).
39 See Jennifer M. O'Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Getting Smart About Getting Tough:
Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1299,
1303-04 (1996) (explaining that juvenile delinquents in 1960s were sent to large
institutions that lacked necessary resources to provide individualized treatment);
Smallheer, supra note 26, at 266 (observing that juvenile offenders were often given "slap
on the wrist"); see also Klein, supra note 36, at 378 (remarking that juvenile status
offenders were being locked up in same institutions as juvenile violent offenders, thus
defeating purpose of individualized treatment).
40 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
41 See id. at 543. "On September 2, 1961, an intruder entered the apartment of a
woman in the District of Columbia. He took her wallet. He raped her ... [The
fingerprints] matched the fingerprints of Morris Kent... Kent was taken into custody by
police." Id.
42 See id. at 546 (stating that Juvenile Court judge did not rule on petitioner's
motions and held no hearings, but rather entered an order waiving jurisdiction and
directing that Kent be held for trial under procedure of U.S. District Court for District of
Columbia).
43 Id. at 550. "On the six counts of housebreaking and robbery, the jury found that
petitioner was guilty." Id.
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total of 30 to 90 years in prison.44 Kent appealed from the
juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction 45 and urged numerous
grounds for reversal of his conviction. 46 The Supreme Court held
that Kent was denied proper procedural safeguards 47 and
remanded the case back to the District Court for a hearing de
novo on waiver.48 The Court noted that while the juvenile court
has considerable latitude in determining whether or not to waive
jurisdiction, the latitude is not absolute.49 The Court held that as
a condition to a valid waiver, the petitioner was entitled to a
hearing and access to certain juvenile records the judge had
considered.50
While Kent was ultimately decided on procedural grounds, it is
considered to be a pivotal case because the Court openly
questioned and criticized the juvenile court system. The Court
stated that "There is much evidence that some juvenile courts,
including that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel,
facilities and techniques to perform adequately as
representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least
with respect to children charged with law violation."51
Additionally, Kent is a landmark case for two other reasons.
First, the Court recognized that waivers into adult criminal court
were appropriate in certain circumstances. 52 Second, the Court
44 Id. "Kent was sentenced to serve five to fifteen years on each count as to which he
was found guilty, or a total of 30 to 90 years in prison." Id.
45 Id. at 548 (stating that petitioner appealed from Juvenile Court judge's order
waiving jurisdiction).
46 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 551 (1966). "Before the Court of Appeals
and in this Court, petitioner's counsel has urged a number of grounds for reversal." Id.
47 See id. at 563. "[W]e conclude that the Court of Appeals and the District Court
erred in sustaining the validity of waiver by the Juvenile Court." Id.
48 See id. at 565. "[W]e vacate the order of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of
the District Court for a hearing de novo on waiver, consistent with this opinion." Id.
49 See id. at 552-53. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute
contemplates that the Juvenile Court should have considerable latitude within which to
determine whether it should retain jurisdiction over a child or ... should waive
jurisdiction. But this latitude is not complete." Id.
50 See id. at 557. "[Me conclude that as a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner
was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and
probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court..." Id.
51 Id. at 556-57.
52 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 551-54 (1966) (noting that though Court
never questioned validity of Juvenile Court Act, which governed waivers in this case,
Court instead focused on statutory language that expressly provided for jurisdictional
waivers after full investigation).
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gave guidelines for a juvenile court judge to use when deciding
whether or not to waive jurisdiction.53
C. Modern Juvenile Court System - Shift in Focus from
Rehabilitation to Retribution
After Kent, both the focus of the juvenile justice system and
American attitudes began to shift away from rehabilitation and
towards retribution. 54 Retribution focuses on punishing the
criminal rather than trying to rehabilitate him,55 and is
53 Id. at 566-67. The Court gave a list of eight factors a judge should consider when
deciding if a jurisdictional waiver is appropriate. The eight Kent factors are:
1. 'The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the
protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury
resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which
a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be determined by
consultation with the United States Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a
crime in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of
his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with
the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other
jurisdictions, prior records of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to
juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently
available to the Juvenile Court."
Id. at 566-67.
54 See Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 WISC. L. REV. 375,
390 (1996) (acknowledging movement towards focusing on retribution and accountability,
which are both objectives of criminal justice system); see also Feld, supra note 33, at 73
(arguing that Supreme Court decisions during 1960's unintentionally transformed
juvenile court system into "wholly-owned subsidiary of criminal justice system"); Eric J.
Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, Juvenile Justice and the Criminal Law: An Assessment of
Legislative Approaches to the Problem of Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case Study of Texas
1973-1995, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 563, 563-65 (1996) (explaining change in public attitude
toward juvenile punishment).
55 See Richard S. Murphy, Comment, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v.
Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1303, 1306-09 (1988) (summarizing basic premises behind retributive theory of
punishment). See generally Aimee D. Borromeo, Comment, Mental Retardation and the
Death Penalty, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 175, 186-88 (2002) (discussing mental state required
for retributive punishment); Christopher Adams Thorn, Note, Retribution Exclusive of
Deterrence: An Insufficient Justification for Capital Punishment, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 199,
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characteristic of an adult criminal sentence. 56 There are various
reasons why the focus has shifted to retribution.
First, there has been a perceived increase in juvenile crime
rates. 57 While juvenile violent crime arrest rates rose between
1980 and 1994, after 1994, juvenile arrest rates have been
steadily declining.58 Second, there is the "superpredator
theory."59 This is a term coined during the 1980's and 1990's to
describe a "new breed" of juvenile offender.60 A superpredator is
201 (1983) (noting that under retribution theory, we seek to punish simply because
offender deserves punishment).
56 See generally Katherine L. Evans, Comment, Trying Juveniles as Adults: Is the
Short Term Gain of Retribution Outweighed by the Long Term Effects on Society, 62 MISS.
L.J. 95, 107-09 (1992) (analyzing how the juvenile justice system is beginning to
encompass adult retributive punishment); Barry C. Feld, Criminal Law: The Juvenile
Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes,
78 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 511 (1987) (observing fundamental changes in states
that have rejected rehabilitative juvenile sentencing in favor of "offense-oriented adult
sentencing policies of retribution, deterrence, and selective incapacitation"); Marisa
Slaten, Note, Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 823-24 (2003) (discussing characteristics of adult retributive
punishment and how it differs from traditional juvenile punishment).
57 See Judith L. Hunter, Symposium, They Grow Up So Fast: When Juveniles Commit
Adult Crimes: A Dilemma For the Juvenile System, 29 AKRON L. REV. 473, 473-74 (1996)
(noting rise in violent crime committed by youth); see also Hon. John B. Leete,
Symposium, They Grow Up So Fast: When Juveniles Commit Adult Crimes: A Dilemma
for the Juvenile System, 29 AKRON L. REV. 491, 497-98 (1996) (discussing 94% increase in
homicides committed by Pennsylvania juveniles from 1987-1994); Reader, supra note 35,
at 488-89 (noting FBI report stating that 11% of all violent crimes are committed by
people under 18).
58 See Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 Report, available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/chapter5.pdf (graphing juvenile violent
crime arrest rates from 1980 until 1997 which shows that juvenile violent crime arrest
rates peaked in 1994, but has since been steadily declining). See generally Christine T.
Greenwood, Note, Holding Parents Criminally Responsible for the Delinquent Acts of
Their Children: Reasoned Response or "Knee-Jerk Reaction?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 401, 408
(1997) (noting that juvenile crime increased at rate of 11 times from 1991-1995); Brandi
Miles Moore, Comment, Blending Sentencing for Juveniles: The Creating of a Third
Criminal Justice System?, 22 J. JUV. L. 126, 128 (2001) (noting that while juvenile
violent crime rates increased between 1980 and 1993, partially due to availability of guns,
juveniles only accounted for 19% for all violent crime arrests in 1994).
59 See Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is the
Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 176-77 (2000)
(observing that commentators, sociologists, and criminologists used this term to reflect
changing perceptions of juvenile offenders); see also Lizabeth N. de Vries, Comment, Guilt
by Association: Proposition 21's Gang Conspiracy Law Will Increase Youth Violence in
California, 37 U.S.F.L. REV. 191, 196-97 (2002) (discussing qualities of "Superpredator');
Howard N. Snyder, Perspective, Gray Rage: A Researcher's Dilemma, 3 J. CENTER
CHILDREN & CTS. 99, 99 (2001) (defining "Superpredator").
60 See Snyder, supra note 59, at 99 (defining "Superpredator"); see also Tanenhaus &
Drizin, supra note 24, at 642 (noting that various academics invented term to
describe"remorseless and morally impoverished youth" whom they predicted would arrive
like "tidal wave"); de Vries, supra note 59, at 196-97 (discussing qualities of
"Superpredator").
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thought to have no social conscience, to exhibit extremely violent
behavior, and to be beyond the control of the juvenile court
system. 61 Lastly, in the wake of Columbine and other highly
publicized school shootings, extremely violent and serious crimes
by juveniles grabbed the public's attention.62 All of these reasons
have led the public and legislature to take new measures in order
to "get tough" on juvenile crime.
II. JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS
Although this proposal can be applicable to a variety of
juvenile offenders, this Note focuses on juvenile sex offenders. In
order to understand why this proposal will be the most adequate
and effective means to deal with juvenile sex offenders, we first
must understand the unique problems and issues that juvenile
sex offenders pose.
A. Characteristics and Motivations of Juvenile Sex Offenders
The terms "sex offender," "sex crimes," and "sex offenses" are
broad terms. As used in this note, they refer to all offenders and
crimes that are sexual in nature, including, but not limited to
rape, incest, and molestation.
Traditionally, juvenile sex offenders have been identified with
crimes of rape, incest, and molestation.63 In recent years, there
61 See Kenneth B. Nunn, The End of Adolescence: The Child as Other: Race and
Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L REV. 679, 711-14
(2002) (listing common attributes of "Superpredator" juveniles and discussing stereotype
cast onto child named "Superpredator"); see also Snyder, supra note 59, at 99 (describing
superpredators as juveniles who would "kill for a new pair of sneakers" and who had
abused drugs and alcohol so much that their DNA was altered); de Vries, supra note 59,
at 196-97 (discussing qualities of "Superpredator").
62 See Tara Kole, Recent Development: Juvenile Offenders, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 231,
231-32 (2001) (stating that day after shootings, representative Bill McCollum introduced
Congress House Bill 1501, Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Accountability and
Rehabilitation Act, which expanded crimes a juvenile could be tried in adult federal court,
lowered age that a juvenile offender could be tried as an adult in federal court, and
allowed for prosecutorial waivers, but bill was never enacted despite fact that House and
Senate overwhelmingly passed bill); see also Jennifer A. Chin, Note, Baby-Face Killers: A
Cry For Uniform Treatment For Youth Who Murder, From Trial to Sentencing, 8 J. L. &
POL'Y 287, 335-36 (1999) (explaining public outcry for harsher juvenile sentences in wake
of Columbine); Darci G. Osther, Note, Juvenile Informants - A Necessary Evil?, 39
WASHBURN L.J. 106, 113-14 (1999) (noting public interest in changing juvenile
punishment system).
63 See Victor I. Vieth, When the Child Abuser is a Child: Investigating, Prosecuting
and Treating Juvenile Sex Offenders in the New Millennium, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 47, 51-
52 (2001) (discussing types of sex crimes juveniles commit most often); see also Timothy E.
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has been a development of a new breed of juvenile sex offenders:
those who have committed sexual offenses during hazing
incidents. 64 The types of crimes committed, and those juvenile
offenders who commit them, greatly differ. This note will
compare the characteristics and motives of both the traditional
juvenile sex offender and the hazer. Additionally, this note will
show that while the traditional juvenile sex offender and the
hazer do not share many of the same characteristics and motives,
this proposal is an effective solution to deal with all types of
juvenile sex offenders.
1. The Traditional Sex Offender
Although there is no one profile that all sex offenders fit in,
there are certain common characteristics that researchers and
experts believe many juvenile sex offenders share. 65 While we
will never be able to conclusively know why juvenile sex
offenders commit these crimes, the common characteristics are
closely related and help us formulate meaningful juvenile
policies.
First, the overwhelming majority of juvenile sex offenders are
male. 66 Additionally, juvenile sex offenders tend to be socially
Wind, The Quandary of Megan's Law: When the Child Sex Offender is a Child, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 73, 76-77 (2003) (explicating extent to which juveniles commit certain
crimes); Pamela S. Richardson, Note, Mandatory Juvenile Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification: The Only Viable Option to Protect All the Nation's Children, 52
CATH. U.L. REV. 237, 246 n.56 (2002) (listing percent distribution of sex crimes among
juveniles).
64 See generally Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing
facts of specific sexual hazing incident); see also Scott R. Rosner & R. Brian Crow, Article,
Institutional Liability for Hazing in Interscholastic Sports, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 275, 279-82
(2002) (explaining how far problem of "hazing" reaches into High School interscholastic
sports); Meredith Goldstein, Hazing Stress Blamed for Teen's Arrest, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct,
10, 2002, at 16 (observing that football team's hazing involved sexual assault of younger
players).
65 See Earl F. Martin & Marsha Kline Pruett, The Juvenile Sex Offender and the
Juvenile Justice System, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 279, 295-302 (1998) (noting that juvenile
sex offenders have similar family relationships); William Winslade, T. Howard Stone,
Michele Smith-Bell & Denise M. Webb, Castrating Pedophiles Convicted of Sex Offenses
Against Children: New Treatment of Old Punishment?, 51 SMU L. Rev. 349, 360-64
(1998) (providing list of common characteristics of juvenile sex offenders); Elizabeth
Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplications of Sex-Offender
Registration and Community Notification Law to Juveniles, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 163, 190-94
(2003) (discussing common characteristics of juvenile sex offenders).
66 See Wind, supra note 63, at 107 (stating that 90% of juvenile sex offenders are male
with median age of fourteen); Jessica E. Mindlin, Comment, Child Sexual Abuse and
Criminal Statutes of Limitation: A Model For Reform, 65 WASH. L. REV. 189, 193 (1990)
(stating that most juvenile sex offenders are male); Sander N. Rothchild, Note, Beyond
Incarceration: Juvenile Sex Offender Treatment Programs Offer Youths a Second Chance,
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isolated from their peers. 67 They are often described as "loners"
who are shy, timid, withdrawn and who "lack the social skills
necessary to develop close and meaningful relationships."68
These loners are more likely to commit crimes against children,
such as molestation. 69 As a result of isolation, a juvenile sex
offender may turn to younger children who they perceive as
socially safer and easier to control. 70
One of the most common characteristics shared by juvenile sex
offenders is that they themselves have been victims of prior
sexual or physical abuse. Statistics show that anywhere from
40% to 80% of juvenile sex offenders have suffered prior sexual
abuse.71 As a victim of sexual abuse, the offender then victimizes
another person to perpetuate the "cycle of abuse."72
Juvenile sex offenders frequently come from a dysfunctional
home and family life. 73 Parents of juvenile sex. offenders have
4 J.L. & POLY 719, 724-25 (observing that juvenile females consist of less than 1% of
rapists).
67 See Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at 295 (stating that researchers have
concluded that social isolation is hallmark descriptor of juvenile sex offender); see also
Janan Hanna, Teen Rape Suspect Could Face Adult Trial, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1998,
Metro Du Page, at 3 (describing some young rapists as socially isolated, unable to get a
date, or mentally challenged); Serena S. Thakur, Note, Juvenile Sex Offenders:
Proposition 21 - The Hope for a Better Solution, 21 J. Juv. L. 97, 98 (2000) (reporting that
one study showed that "65% of juvenile sexual offenders showed evidence of significant
social isolation").
68 Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at 296.
69 See id. at 296 (noting that juvenile molesters are more likely as a group to have
less intimate relationships and fewer friends, particularly, fewer female friends); see also
Sean Flynn, Actions Often Reflect Abuser's Experiences, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 17, 1994,
at 19 (describing typical teen-age sex offenders who molest younger children as socially
inept and uncomfortable with peers of their own age). See generally Thakur, supra note
67, at 98-100 (observing that many juvenile sex offenders have few or no friends).
70 See Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at 296 (noting that juvenile child molesters
may look to younger children who appear to be emotionally safer); see also Barbara Laker,
An All American Boy- But Jeff's Good Looks Hide A Dark Side, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 9, 1992, at A6 (reporting story of 16 year old child molester who
described his victims as "less knowledgeable, easier to victimize"); Wind, supra note 63, at
108 (observing that loners may perceive young children as easier to manage).
71 See, Wind, supra note 63, at 107 (noting that sex offenders are more likely to be
prior victims of abuse); see also Flynn, supra note 69, at 19 (noting that juvenile abusers
"tend to pick victims close in age to their own when they were abused"); Stacey Hiller,
Note, The Problem With Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: The Detrimental Effects of
Public Disclosure, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 281 (1998) (commenting that past sexual
victimization may be contributing cause to juvenile sex offender's inappropriate behavior).
72 See Robin Deems; Comment, California's Sex Offender Notification Statute: A
Constitutional Analysis, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1195, 1240 (1996) (observing that juvenile
sex offenders are often themselves victims of prior sexual abuse and are thus repeating
the cycle of abuse); Thakur, supra note 67, at 99 (observing the cyclical nature of sexual
abuse).
73 See Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at 296-97 (observing that family dysfunction
is common characteristic shared by all juvenile delinquents, not just juvenile sex
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been found to have high rates of psychiatric disorders,
alcoholism, family violence, and divorce. 74 Additionally, juvenile
sex offenders themselves often suffer from various psychiatric
disorders, specifically disorders that affect the juvenile's impulse
control and cause aggressive behavior. 75 A juvenile sex offender
may act out his aggression or psychotic tendency in the form of a
sexual assault. 76
2. Hazing: A New Breed of Juvenile Sexual Offender
Traditionally, juvenile sex offenders were often identified with
sex crimes such as rape, molestation, incest, etc.77 In recent
years, a new type of sex crime is emerging. Sexual offenses
offenders); see also Tom Leversee & Christy Pearson, Responding to Juvenile Delinquency:
Eliminating the Pendulum Effect: A Balanced Approach to the Assessment, Treatment,
and Management of Sexually Abusive Youth, 3 J. CENTER CHILDREN & CTS. 45, 47 (2001)
(noting that sexually abusive youths often have experienced history of abuse, both sexual
and physical as well as neglect, loss of parent, disruptions of care, or domestic violence);
Howard Pankratz, Court: Limits on Sex-Offender Foster Homes Unfair Restrictions Block
Care, Justices Rule, DENV. POST, Jan. 14, 2003, at B-02 (noting that many juvenile sex
offenders living in city's foster homes came from dysfunctional families).
74 See Center for Sex Offender Management, Understanding Juvenile Sexual Offender
Behavior: Emerging Research, Treatment Approaches and Management Practices, at 2
(Dec. 1999) [hereinafter Juvenile CSOM], available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/
juvbrflO.pdf (linking exposure to family violence to juvenile sex offender's motivation); see
also Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at 296-97 (reporting studies which showed that
juvenile sex offenders tend to have high rates of separation from their parents, parents
with psychiatric disturbances, alcohol abuse, and domestic violence); Thakur, supra note
67, at 99 (finding that juvenile sex offenders tend to grow up in similar households).
75 See Juvenile CSOM, supra note 74, at 3 (noting that studies have shown that up to
80% of juvenile sex offenders have a diagnosable psychiatric disorder, that between 30 %
and 60% of juvenile sex offenders exhibit some form of academic or learning disability,
and that one researcher has identified four categories of juvenile sex offenders including
adolescents with a psychiatric condition that compromises his or her ability to regulate
and inhibit aggressive and sexual impulses); see also Hiller, supra note 71, at 281-82
(stating that various sociological factors can act as causes of juvenile sexual misconduct,
as well as that biological abnormalities can also contribute to sexually aggressive
behavior); Leversee & Pearson, supra, note 73, at 46 (noting that biological abnormalities
such as chemical imbalances in brain also contribute to juvenile's overwhelming need for
sensation and encourage sexually aggressive behavior).
76 See Wind, supra note 63, at 107-08 (theorizing that juvenile's psychiatric disorder
may lead him to have problems controlling his impulses and aggressive behavior); see also
Hiller, supra note 71, at 282 (noting that some juveniles, especially those in face of
encouragement, channel need for thrill-seeking into sexually aggressive behavior);
Richardson, supra note 63, at 246-48 (describing category of juvenile sex offenders who
abuse peers or adults as more likely to commit their offenses with aggression and
violence).
77 See Leversee & Pearson, supra, note 73, at 46 (noting that juveniles commit as
many as 13 % to 16 % of rapes and 18 % of other sexual assaults); see also Martin &
Pruett, supra note 65, at 286-87 (stating that approximately 20% of all rapes and
between 30% and 50% of all child molestations are perpetrated by adolescent males);
Vieth, supra note 63, at 51 (noting that brother-sister sexual contact may be five times as
common as father-daughter incest).
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committed during "hazings" have gained increasing notoriety and
have created a new breed of sexual offenders. 78
Hazing can be defined as "any action taken or situation
created, intentionally, whether on or off a school campus, to
produce a mental or physical discomfort, embarrassment,
harassment, or ridicule."79 Hazing is not a new phenomenon and
has in fact been around for many years.80 Hazing is generally
done in fraternities, sororities, athletic teams, clubs,
organizations, etc.81 Hazing often includes mental and or
physical aspects that a younger or new member must endure to
become part of the organization or team.8 2 While hazing often
includes harmless initiation rites, it has escalated to very serious
78 See Karen Kucher, Hazing Not 'Just Fun'Anymore; Schools Enact Strict Policies on
Pranks, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 2, 2000, at Bi (noting that three baseball
players at Rancho Bernardo High School sodomized a freshman teammate with
broomstick); Bob Migra, Hazing Haunts Memory of Ex-Wrestler, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 19, 2003, at C10 (recounting late 1990's hazing incident that occurred
when fellow wrestlers hazed fifteen year old member of team by verbally, physically, and
sexually assaulting him); see also Fred A. Mohr, Schools Work to Curb Abuse; Parents
Must Monitor More What Children Are Exposed to, Expert Says, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse), Nov. 30, 2003 at B3 (suggesting that "[tihe Fulton locker room case, as well as
two sports-related hazings at Tompkins County schools and a Long Island football camp
incident, represent the dark side of the changing sexual mores of the past few decades").
79 Christine Torres, Making Waves; Hazing Hits at Dignity of Human, LEDGER
(Lakeland, Fl.), Oct. 30, 2001, at H1.
80 See Dara Aquila Govan, "Hazing Out" the Membership Intake Process in Sororities
and Fraternities: Preserving the Integrity of the Pledge Process Versus Addressing Hazing
Liability, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 679, 686 (2001) (recalling that hazing can be traced back to
World War II where "boot camp mentality" of veterans eventually wound up in Greek
life); see also Michael John James Kuzmich, In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and
Alcohol-Related Deaths, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 1087, 1093 (2000) (discussing hazing's
existence in some form in probably every school "since time immemorial"); Rosner &
Crow, supra note 64, at 276 (observing that hazing has been around for over one hundred
years in United States).
81 See Dixon, supra note 6, at 357 (stating that "hazing is normally associated with
college-level organizations such as fraternities, sororities, and sports teams- .. "); see also
Amie Pelletier, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of Current Anti-Hazing
Statutes, 28 N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 377, 377-78 (2002) (listing places where hazing
is prevalent, including athletic teams, fraternities, and military); Raymond J. Toney &
Shazia N. Anwar, International Human Rights Law and Military Personnel: A Look
Behind the Barrack Walls, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 519, 527-29 (1998) (detailing typical
case of ritual hazing in military).
82 See Govan, supra note 80, at 687 (tracing transition in hazing from one that
originally consisted of "rough-and-tumble antics such as swats with paddles" to one
evolving into "public stunts, humiliating games, punishing physical exercises and other
forms of psychological discomfort" (quoting Katy Marquardt, A Compact History of the
Greek Empire at U. Texas, DAILY TEXAN VIA U-WIRE, Aug. 27, 1999)); see also Pelletier,
supra note 81, at 378-79 (summarizing what hazing is by providing various definitions
created by number of organizations and associations); Toney & Anwar, supra note 81, at
528-29 (detailing physical and emotional toll that typical hazing event took on less-
tenured military recruits).
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and dangerous activities in the past few years.8 3 Most notably,
there have been recent hazing events that have involved juvenile
high school students committing sexual offenses.8 4 These hazing
events involve serious sexual crimes that require the proper
punishment of the offenders.
Although there is little research on teenager hazers, it appears
that juveniles who commit sex offenses during "hazings" or
initiation rites often do not share the same common
characteristics that traditional sex offenders usually have. The
most obvious difference is that hazers are generally not loners.8 5
In fact, they are the opposite. They are often very popular and
social teenagers who are on athletic teams, cheerleading squads,
and clubs.8 6 In addition, there is typically no evidence that
hazers were prior victims of abuse.8 7 However, there is evidence
83 See David S. Doty, No More Hazing: Eradication Through Law and Education, 10
UTAH BAR J. 18, 18 (1997) (recounting Maryland fraternity hazing incident where victim
was beat with hammer, whip, and chair leg); see also Govan, supra note 80, at 679
(discussing fraternity hazing incident where two pledges suffered kidney failures after
fraternity members painted fraternity symbol on pledges' backs with toxic substance);
Rosner & Crow, supra note 64, at 276 (recognizing that harmless hazing can include
having team rookies carry bags or sing songs).
84 See Jackie MacMullan, Aftershocks the Pentucket Hazing Case Still Torments a
Victim and a Community, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 2002, at C1 (reporting on an incident
where high school football player was pinned down by three teammates who attempted to
violate him with peeled banana); see also Greg Sandoval, Athletes Face Assault Charges,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2002, at D10 (detailing high school hazing incident where teenage
boy was forced to participate in simulated sex acts during preseason football camp by
other teammates); Schuster & Morris, supra note 6, at A03 (describing incidents of
sodomy where senior members of Mepham's high school football team hazed younger
players with golf balls, broomsticks, and pine cones).
85 See generally Doty, supra note 83, at 18 (describing high school hazing incident
involving football team captains and student body officer); Govan, supra note 80, at 689
(reviewing incident where pledge at University of Nevada's social drinking club consumed
excessive amounts of alcohol at club's initiation ceremony where many club members
were present); Joe LaPointe, Hockey; Trying to Skate Past a Hazing Scandal, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2000, at Sports Desk (reporting on hazing incident where University of
Vermont's new hockey team members were coerced into various activities to appease
veteran players on team).
86 See generally Doty, supra note 83, at 18 (detailing hazing incident committed by
individuals including football team captains and an officer of student body); John
Gonzalez, Federal Court Gets Party Case; Cheerleaders' Ouster Raises Legal Questions,
HOUS. CHRONICLE, Mar. 28, 2002, at A25 (noting that 15 out of 16 Alamo Heights High
School cheerleaders were dismissed from squad due to party involving drinking and
hazing); Rosner & Crow, supra note 64, at 279-91 (summarizing recent hazing events
which included members of Connecticut high school wrestling team and members of
Arizona basketball and track team).
87 See generally Doty, supra note 83, at 18 (describing hazing incident with no
mention of any previous sexual abuse suffered by any of hazers); Brian Harmon,
Ringleader of Hazing Pack; Troubled Teen Blamed for Leading Vicious Attacks, DAILY
NEWS (New York), Dec. 21, 2003, at 94 (describing three teens involved in Mepham
hazing incident and not mentioning any prior sexual abuse when discussing their
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that some hazers may come from dysfunctional families and
troubled home lives.88 Further, sex offenses committed during
hazings are committed for different motivations.8 9 Hazing is
usually done for a variety of reasons such as to foster teamwork,
form a bond between old and new members, carry on "tradition,"
prove loyalty, and serve as a rite of passage. 90
The advent of recent hazings involving sexual crimes requires
us to impose legislative reforms to deal with such sexual
offenders. While the characteristics and motives of traditional
juvenile sex offenders and hazers are different, they are both still
committing harmful sexual offenses that cause serious harm.
The ideal legislative reform would be one that will effectively
deal with both the traditional juvenile sex offender and the
hazer. This proposal is applicable to all juvenile sex offenders
because it is based on the sexual nature of the offense and the
age the juvenile commits the crimes. Additionally, blended
sentencing is an effective means to deal with all sexual offenders.
B. Recidivism and Rehabilitation
One of the problems we face when dealing with sex offenders or
juvenile offenders is whether or not they are capable of being
disciplinary records and personal lives outside of school); LaPointe, supra note 85, at
Sports Desk (leaving out any hint of hazers having suffered prior sexual abuse).
88 See Harmon, supra note 87, at 94 (observing that one of defendants in Mepham
incident had father with history of drug abuse, legal problems, and martial problems); see
also Reena Shah, Increase Seen in Sex Crimes Among Youth, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(FLORIDA), Dec. 18, 1989, at 1B (referring to therapist sentiments that parents rarely
detect abuse of juvenile sex offenders and actually often contribute to abuse through
creation of some type of residual anger within child which originates from home); cf.
Dixon, supra note 6, at 362 (conveying that parents should take active role in "teaching
their children the values of civility and kindness in connection with their behavior
towards others...").
89 See generally Govan, supra note 80, at 686 (discussing how hazing was used to
imbue notions of Greek tradition and life. Sexual abuse is far from notions of such
tradition); Harmon, supra note 87, at 94 (noting that one of defendants involved with
Mepham incident had threatened one of victims prior to commencement of crime due to
hostile shoving match that had taken place between two parties indicating that his
motivations were not for sake of tradition); Kuzmich, supra note 80, at 1093 (detailing
how hazing signified formal introduction where beginner had been given some new
knowledge).
90 See Dixon, supra note 6, at 361-62 (noting that Alfred University survey found
that students felt hazing was "traditional rite of passage" necessary for membership into
an organization); Govan, supra note 80, at 686 (discussing history of hazing and how
traditions and rites associated with Greek ideals were used to rationalize hazing);
Michael Dobie, What is Hazing?, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 12, 1999, at C7 (finding that
hazing is supposed to strengthen bonds between team members).
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rehabilitated.91 This is an even more pertinent concern when we
are dealing with juvenile sex offenders. 92 There is a common
public belief that sex offenders, both juvenile and adult, are not
capable of being reformed.93 Society fears are further fueled by
the belief that juvenile sex offenders will continue to commit
crimes and will grow up to become more serious adult sex
offenders.94 Indeed, studies often show that they have higher
rates of recidivism. 95 If juvenile sex offenders are not capable of
being rehabilitated, then why should we send them to a juvenile
91 See Kathey Alexander, 'Plenty of Blame to Go Around' Legislators Cite Juvenile
Justice System's Woes, Seek Remedies, ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, Sept. 29,
1994, at 1 (stating that problems with juvenile justice system at issue had to deal with
decreasing confidentiality afforded to juveniles and costs of system itself); Gregory Kane,
Slaps on Wrist Hurt Juveniles, Their Victims, BALT. SUN, Aug. 21, 2004, at 1B
(characterizing Baltimore's rehabilitation-based juvenile justice system as ineffective slap
on wrist of juvenile criminals); Roger Roy, They Need Help and Don't Get it; Even Insiders
Admit Florida's Juvenile-Justice System is Failing, ORLANDO SENTINEL (FLORIDA), May
27, 1990, at Al (discussing how Florida's juvenile justice system, which is based on
philosophy of correcting and helping problematic juveniles, is failing as number of youth-
crimes increases rapidly and nature of crimes involved becomes more severe).
92 See Alexander, supra note 91, at 1 (introducing article by noting that 11-year old
rapist was let out onto streets to confront his victim after only 19 days of rehabilitation);
see also Shah, supra note 88, at 1B (stating that parents of juvenile sex offenders often
take their child's crimes lightly and do not act sufficiently to prevent further occurrences
and that merely telling offenders to "stop" is ineffective. The article further discusses jail
as an insufficient rehabilitative technique for juvenile sex offenders because they are
typically already alone in their lives and do not need to be further isolated from society);
Vieth, supra note 63, at 71-72 (noting that juvenile sex offenders are likely to commit
sexual or non-sexual offense again in future).
93 See Robert R. Hindman, Megan's Law and it's Progeny: Whom Will The Courts
Protect?, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 201, 204 (1997) (stating that majority of sex offenders are not
successfully rehabilitated); see also Thakur, supra note 67, at 101 (discussing that sex
offenders had higher rate of recidivism than other juvenile offenders); Chrisandrea L.
Turner, Note, Convicted Sex Offenders v. Our Children: Whose Interests Deserve the
Greater Protection?, 86 KY. L.J. 477, 488 (1997) (stating that sex offenders are most
difficult class of criminals to rehabilitate).
94 See Hindman, supra note 93, at 203 (noting that sex offenders' propensity to
commit offenses does not decrease with time); see also Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at
287-88 (stating that research revealed that many young sexual offenders grow into older,
more dangerous predators); Thakur, supra note 67, at 101 (noting that society's views are
shaped by common fear that juvenile sex offenders will continue to commit even more
serious sexual offenses as they become adults).
95 But see Abril R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community
Notification Laws, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 896 (stating that sex offenders are no more
likely to be recidivists than other criminals); see also Leonore M.J. Simon, The Treatment
of Sex Offenders: The Myth of Sex Offender Specialization: An Empirical Analysis, 23 N.E.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 387, 392 (1997) (arguing that there is no empirical data to
support conclusion that sex offenders have recidivism rates higher than non-sex
offenders); Alan Kabat, Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender Databases and Community
Notification: Sacrificing Personal Privacy for a Symbol's Sake, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 333,
335 (1998) (stating that sex offenders are no more likely to relapse into criminal behavior
than other types of offenders).
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facility in the first place? Instead, adult prison may be the
proper place for them.
The answer to these concerns is that first, there is no
conclusive proof the sex offenders, both juvenile and adult,
cannot be rehabilitated.96 Second, despite the lack of research on
juvenile sex offenders, many commentators believe that the
recidivism rates of juvenile sex offenders are not higher than
recidivism rates of non-sexual juvenile offenders.9 7 Most of the
research on juvenile sex offenders has been done on those
juveniles who have received some form of treatment. 98 Several
studies in the mid 1990's showed that juvenile sex offenders who
have participated in treatment programs had recidivism rates of
between 7% and 13% over a five-year period. 99 Other studies
done during the same time have shown recidivism rates of non-
sexual offenders to be between 15% and 50%.100 Studies on adult
sex offenders have produced analogous results.101
96 See Michael H. Marcus, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 671, 673-74 (2004) (stating that
treatment aimed at risk factors is significantly effective at lowering sex offender
recidivism); see also Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at 310 (concluding that recent
improvements in modern treatments suggest that they have significant impact on
recidivism rates (quoting Judith v. Becker, Offenders: Characteristics and Treatment, 4
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 181, 186 (1994)); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Justice,
Ethics, and Interdisciplinary Teaching and Practice: Mental Health and the Law, 14
WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 315, 321-22 (indicating that treatment may mitigate risk of
recidivism in sex offenders).
97 See Richardson, supra note 63, at 249 (noting that research on juvenile sex offender
recidivism is scarce); see also Wind, supra note 63, at 105 (indicating that juvenile
offenders were more likely to repeat non-sexual related acts than to commit another
sexual offense); Center for Sex Offender Management, Recidivism of Sex Offenders (May
2001), at 16, available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.html [hereinafter
Recidivism CSOM] (commenting on lack of research on juvenile sex offender recidivism
rates).
98 See Wind, supra note 63, at 105 (stating that most studies on juvenile sex offenders
examine effectiveness of treatment protocols). But see Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at
313 (indicating that research is slow in coming because most youths will not choose
treatment, and therefore research, unless mandated). See generally Recidivism CSOM,
supra note 97, at 13-14 (graphing statistics from studies done on comparisons of
recidivism rates of treated and untreated child molesters and re-arrest rates of treated
and untreated sex offenders).
99 See Wind, supra note 63, at 105 (noting statistics from early 1990's on juvenile sex
offenders who have been treated in treatment programs). See generally Martin & Pruett,
supra note 65, at 309 (stating prevention of recidivism as main goal of treatment
programs); Recidivism CSOM, supra note 97, at 7 (reporting recidivism rates based on
type of sexual offense committed, i.e. incest, rape, child molesters and exhibitionists).
100 See Wind, supra note 63, at 105 (providing recidivism rates for non-sexual
offenders). See generally Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at 310 (discussing elements
which impact recidivism rates); Recidivism CSOM, supra note 97 (noting that studies
have been done involving both sexual and non-sexual juvenile offenders).
101 See Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 NW. U.L. REV. 1203,
1208 (1998) (indicating that sex offenders do not have higher recidivism rates than other
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While the studies seem to support the idea that juvenile sex
offenders would be responsive to rehabilitative treatments, there
are some problems with these studies. The biggest problem is
that these studies are generally done on offenders who have
received treatment. 102 They do not compare their results to the
many sex offenders who go untreated. 103 Thus, it is not clear that
the treatments are primarily responsibly for a lower recidivism
rate. There is much dispute as to whether or not these
treatments work.104 Additionally, there are commentators who
believe that the recidivism rates of sex offenders, both juvenile
and adult, are actually higher because many sexual assaults go
unreported due to fear of embarrassment, shame, or other
similar reasons. 105 Finally, despite the above statistics, many
criminals); Kenneth Crimaldi, "Megan's Law" Election-Year Politics and Constitutional
Rights, 27 RUTGERS L. J. 169, 174 (1995) (stating that only through selective reading of
available research can one conclude that sex offenders have higher recidivism rate than
other criminals); Center for Sex Offender Management, Myths and Facts About Sex
Offenders, at 3-4 (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.html
[hereinafter Myths CSOM] (attempting to dispel myth that adult sex offenders are likely
to commit repeat offenses by noting that recidivism rates for sex offenders are actually
lower than recidivism rates of general criminal population, particularly noting that a
study performed in 1995 showed that 63% of non-sexual offenders released from prison
were rearrested within three years of their release).
102 See Kris W. Druhm, A Welcome Return to Draconia: California Penal Law 645,
The Castration of Sex Offenders and the Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REV. 285, 299 (1997)
(noting that, until recently, there were few serious, controlled, group studies on
effectiveness of treatment for sex offenders and recent studies have incorporated control
groups); see also Gerald G. Gaes, Timothy J. Flanagan, Laurence L. Motiuk & Lynn
Stewart, Adult Correctional Treatment, 26 CRIME & JUST. 361, 410-11 (1999) (suggesting
that full effects of research must be viewed cautiously due to muddy research
methodology); Wind, supra note 63, at 105 (indicating that methodological flaws may have
impacted outcome of post-treatment sex-offender recidivism research).
103 See generally Gaes, et al., supra note 102, at 410-11 (noting that problems with
research methodology raise question of whether conclusions can be drawn regarding
effectiveness of treatment); Wind, supra note 63, at 105 (discussing concern that research
results may have been altered by methodological flaws in research methods). But see
Thomas J. Reed, Article, The Re-Birth of the Delaware Rules of Evidence: A Summary of
the 2002 Changes in the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence, 5 DEL. L. REV. 155, 172 n.36
(stating that many past studies on sexual offender treatment did include a control group
of untreated offenders).
104 See Andrew A. Hammel, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator Civil
Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775,
810 (1995) (proposing that treatment of sex offenders may not be worth the time or money
due to disappointing results); Eric Lotke, Politics and Irrelevance: Community
Notification Statutes, 10 FED. SENT. R. 64, 6-7 (1997) (discussing inconclusiveness of
research indicating that recidivism rates are reduced by treatment); Lisa Kavanaugh,
Note, Massachusetts's Sexually Dangerous Persons Legislation: Can Juries Make a Bad
Law Better?, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 509, 527 (2000) (stating that there is little
evidence that treatment is effective in reducing sex offender recidivism rates).
105 See Vieth, supra note 63, at 51 (suggesting that fear of being labeled homosexual
causes boys not to report sexual victimizations); see also Recidivism CSOM, supra note
97, at 3-4 (explaining that various studies have shown that large numbers of sexual
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experts believe that there is a class of serious sex offenders, both
juvenile and adult, that simply cannot be rehabilitated. 106
Due to the conflicting studies on recidivism and rehabilitation
of juvenile sex offenders, there is no clear answer whether
juvenile sex offenders can be rehabilitated or not. Since there are
some studies that indicate that juvenile sex offenders can be
rehabilitated,107  we should at least give juvenile sex an
opportunity for rehabilitation before we impose strictly punitive
measures on them.
Despite the lack of conclusive information on the potential
success of rehabilitation and treatment, it should be noted that
there are certain significant differences between juvenile and
adult sex offenders that support the conclusion that juvenile sex
offenders would benefit from rehabilitative juvenile facilities.
First, many experts believe that juvenile sex offenders respond
better to treatment options as opposed to adult sex offenders.l0 8
Second, it is argued that juvenile sex offenders "possess a less
deeply ingrained sexual deviant pattern than do adult
offenders."109 Third, because of their age, juvenile sex offenders
are still learning and exploring their sexuality.110 In sum, there
assaults go unreported due to fear of being further victimized, being punished by offender
and/or offender's family and friends, not being believed, and being traumatized by
criminal justice system); Wind, supra note 63, at 109-110 (noting that if victim is within
offender's family, the event will often go unreported).
106 See Jean Peters-Baker, Comment, Challenging Traditional Notions of Managing
Sex Offenders: Prognosis is Lifetime Management, 66 UMKC L. REV. 629, 647 (suggesting
that "fixated pedophiles" are not receptive to treatment and pose serious danger to
public); Chrisandrea L. Turner, Note, Convicted Sex Offenders v. Our Children: Whose
Interests Deserve the Greater Protection? 86 K.Y. L.J. 477, 490 (1997) (finding that
recidivism rates are unaffected by treatment). But see Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at
310 (noting that modern treatments may eventually prove to have substantial affect on
recidivism).
107 See Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at 310-13 (discussing effectiveness of
treatment, specifically multi-component programs, but also noting that further studies
are needed to evaluate new treatments); see also Thakur, supra note 67, at 105 (stating
that treatments currently used in juvenile court system are ineffective and do not
rehabilitate offenders). But see Wind, supra note 63, at 105 (noting that research on
recidivism in juvenile sex offenders indicates that rehabilitation is successful, but that
these studies may have methodological flaws).
108 See Hiller, supra note 71, at 291 (noting that those who work with juvenile sex
offenders, such as child psychologists, believe that between 70% and 90% of juvenile sex
offenders can be rehabilitated with proper treatment); Wind, supra note 63, at 105-06
(suggesting that adolescent sex offenders respond to treatment better than adults). But
see Thakur, supra note 67, at 103 (noting that society's belief that adolescents are likelier
to be rehabilitated is diminishing).
109 Wind, supra note 63, at 103.
110 See Thakur, supra note 67, at 99 (observing that juvenile sex offenders may be
wishing to fulfill inappropriate sexual fantasies); Wind, supra note 63, at 105-06 (stating
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is support for giving juvenile sex offenders a chance to be
rehabilitated in juvenile facilities.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
As stated earlier, juvenile sex offenders commit very harmful
and injurious crimes. Our present juvenile system is not
adequately handling such criminals. This note proposes changes
in three distinct areas of the current juvenile law. These areas
are on which waiver provision should be utilized, the court in
which the juvenile is prosecuted in and what sentence should be
imposed. Collectively, these three changes will provide for the
most effect means in adjudicating juvenile sex offenders.
A. Waivers
1. Different Models of Waivers
In order to reform the juvenile court system, we first must
understand how our present law operates with respect to juvenile
offenders. Under current law, all cases involving juveniles begin
in juvenile court.li The juvenile's case either stays in juvenile
court or is transferred to adult criminal court through a waiver of
the juvenile's jurisdiction. 112 There are different types of waivers,
and jurisdiction varies as to which type or types they employ.113
that adolescent sexual fantasies have not become a permanent part of adolescent's
identity). But see Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at 283-84 (noting that research has
invalidated theory that all adolescents who act out sexually are just exploring).
111 See Wind, supra note 63, at 82-85 (discussing emergence of juvenile court system
and system's purpose); see also Stacey Sabo, Note, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of
Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdictions, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2430 (1996) (noting
that as of 1945 every state had a juvenile court). See generally Kamenstein, supra note 27,
at 2108-10 (summarizing history of juvenile court justice system).
112 See Martin & Pruett, supra note 62, at 310, 325-28 (noting that one of two main
issues in dealing with juvenile sex offender is whether juvenile court that has jurisdiction
over an individual should maintain jurisdiction or transfer him to criminal court); see also
Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to
Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 509-10 (1995) (finding and explaining
development, whereby juveniles are increasingly being waived into adult criminal justice
system); Slaten, supra note 56, at 831-32 (discussing generally how juvenile enters
criminal court through waivers of jurisdiction).
113 See Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Criminology: The Back-Door to Prison:
Waiver Reform: "Blended Sentencing," and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997, 1000 (2001) (listing various waivers court's can use to
waive juvenile's jurisdiction); see also Guttman, supra note 112, at 520-22 (noting that
states use different waivers and combinations of waivers). See generally Slaten, supra
note 56, at 831-34 (summarizing waivers and noting that states apply them differently).
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The different waiver provisions vary as to who gets to control the
waiver and the criteria necessary for the waiver. 114 Generally,
there are four basic types of waivers: 1) judicial waivers; 2)
legislative waivers / statutory exclusions;1 i5 3) prosecutorial
waivers / direct file; and 4) reverse waiver / transfer back
waivers. 116
Judicial waivers are the most common type of waiver device
used. 117 Statutes authorizing judicial waivers confer authority on
the juvenile court judge to decide whether or not to waive
jurisdiction to adult court.118 Judicial waivers can be
discretionary, mandatory, or presumptive.119
Many states have legislative waivers or statutory
exclusions.120 Under this scheme, the juvenile court's original
114 See Slaten, supra note 56, at 831-37. (observing that in prosecutorial waivers,
prosecutor makes decision to waive jurisdiction; while in judicial waivers, it is judge's
decision); see also Guttman, supra note 112, at 520-29 (discussing various actors in
different waiver processes and problems inherent in each waiver). See generally Sabo,
supra note 111, at 2436-45 (explaining how each waiver mechanism works).
115 See Slaten, supra note 56, at 835-36 (discussing that legislative waivers and
statutory exclusion essentially mean same thing and operate in same way, as juvenile
court's original jurisdiction is removed over certain individuals, meaning that certain
juveniles are "excluded" from juvenile court); see also Thakur, supra note 67, at 106
(noting that legislative waivers act to bring certain crimes within jurisdiction of criminal
court); Sabo, supra note 111, at 2444-45 (stating that legislative waivers target crimes
that are serious or violent, and generally targets repeat offenders).
116 See Sabo, supra note 111, at 2445 (explaining mechanics of reverse waiver);
Slaten, supra note 56, at 831-32 (listing different types of waivers). See generally Thakur,
supra note 67, at 106 (positing that prosecutorial waiver is most controversial waiver).
117 See Eric J. Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, An Assessment of Legislative Approaches to
the Problems of Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case Study of Texas: 1973-1995, 23 AM. CRIM.
L. 563, 571 (1996) (noting that judicial waiver is most common type used); see also Slaten,
supra note 56, at 832 (discussing judicial waivers); Thakur, supra note 67, at 106
(outlining judicial waiver procedure).
118 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-327(C) (1999) (authorizing judge to transfer
juvenile "[I]f the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that probable cause exists
to believe that the offense was committed, that the juvenile committed the offense and
that the public safety would best be served by the transfer of the juvenile for criminal
prosecution..."); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(a) (2001) (allowing for prosecution to request
transfer to juvenile court under certain specified circumstances). See generally Guttman,
supra note 112, at 531-41 (discussing judicial waiver, its benefits, and disadvantages via
Massachusetts case).
119 See 42 Pa. C.S. § 6355 (2004) (stating that certain acts, such as murder,
necessitate transfer to criminal court); see also Slaten, supra note 56, at 832-34 (noting
that discretionary waivers allow juvenile court to decide on an individual basis whether or
not to waive jurisdiction, mandatory waivers allow juvenile judge only to decide whether
or not juvenile has met statutory requirements, and presumptive waivers confer
presumption of criminal prosecution if specified type of case or combination of factors is
present). See generally Joshua T. Rose, Innocence Lost: The Detrimental Effect of
Automatic Waiver Statutes on Juvenile Justice, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 977, 983-85 (2003)
(discussing effects of presumptive and mandatory waiver).
120 See Randall T. Salekin, et al., Juvenile Waiver to Adult Criminal Courts:
Prototypes for Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and Amenability to Treatment, 7
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jurisdiction is automatically removed in certain specified
circumstances. 121 Instead, adult criminal court has original
jurisdiction. Such cases are "excluded" from juvenile court.122
States have different statutorily prescribed triggering events. 123
Most often, a statute will remove jurisdiction based on the
juvenile's age and / or the charges facing the juvenile.124 For
example, in Georgia, the criminal court had jurisdiction over
juveniles between the ages of thirteen and seventeen who are
charged with one of the listed offenses, including murder and
rape. 125
PSYCH. PUB. POL. AND L. 381, 382 (1999) (stating that forty-seven states have some type of
transfer provision and more than half of such states provide for statutory exclusion); see
also Eric J. Fritch and Craig Hemmins, Note, An Assessment of Legislative Approaches to
the Problem of Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case Study of Texas 1973-1995. 23 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 563, 580 (1996) (stating that thirty-six state legislatures have commanded that juvenile
courts cannot take on certain criminal cases); Amy M. Thorson, Note, From Parens
Patriae to Crime Control: A Comparison of the History and Effectiveness of the Juvenile
Justice Systems in the United States and Canada, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 845, 854
(1999) (noting that number of states with statutory exclusions has increased nine fold
since 1975).
121 See Eric L. Jensen, The Waiver of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Policy Goals,
Empirical Realities, and Suggestions for Change, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 173, 181 (1994)
(explaining that legislative waivers remove transfer decision from juvenile judges and
instead make transfer automatic); see also Rose, supra note 119, at 978 (adding that judge
is stripped of his discretion under automatic waiver); Christine Chamberlin, Note, Not
Kids Anymore: A Need for Punishment and Deterrence in the Juvenile Justice System, 42
B.C. L. REV. 391, 401 (2001) (recapitulating that transfer is automatic based on two
determinants: defendant's age and type of crime involved).122 See Martin & Pruett, supra note 65, at 326 (noting that matters dealing with
certain crimes are "excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction"). See generally Jensen,
supra note 121, at 182 (stating that under most waiver policies, the offenses usually
excluded from juvenile court are violent crimes and other felonies); Slaten, supra note 56,
at 834 (discussing statutes that exclude juveniles charged with violent crimes from
juvenile court jurisdiction).
123 See Slaten, supra note 56, at 835 (noting that Vermont excludes juveniles as
young as ten years old while in Mississippi, jurisdiction is excluded for juveniles ages
thirteen and older charged with felony or capital crime); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, The
Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 584 (2000) (highlighting that
states have lowered age necessary to trigger transfer hearing and broadened category of
crimes that could induce transfer); Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at
Which Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile
Crime? A State-by-State Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 804 (explaining that in
Oregon, "the juvenile court can waive any minor under age fifteen for murder, first degree
rape, first degree sodomy, and first degree unlawful sexual penetration").
124 See, e.g., C.R.S. 19-2-518(1)(a)(I) (2003) (providing for transfer to criminal court in
Colorado if defendant is twelve or thirteen and has been charged with committing class
one or two felony "or a crime of violence," or fourteen or older and has been charged with
committing any felony); O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (bestowing exclusive jurisdiction on
criminal court in Georgia for juveniles aged thirteen through seventeen who have been
charged with one or more of listed offenses); W. Va. Code § 49-5-10(d) (2003) (allowing
hearing for waiver if defendant is at least fourteen years old and has been charged with
one of listed crimes).
125 See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (listing felonies that can result in transfer to
criminal court). See generally Miller v. State, 571 S.E.2d 788, 793-94 (Ga. 2002) (affirming
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Prosecutorial waivers, also known as direct files or concurrent
jurisdiction, have become more popular in recent years. 126 This
system gives the juvenile court and the criminal court concurrent
jurisdiction over certain juvenile defendants. 127 While states vary
as to over which defendants both courts will have jurisdiction
over, it is usually based on the age of the defendant and the
charges.128 Prosecutorial waivers place all of the power in the
prosecutor's hands.129 The prosecutor has discretion to decide
whether he wants to file charges against the juvenile in either
juvenile court or criminal court. 130
validity of O.C.G.A. §15-11-28(b)(2)(A)); State v. Ware, 574 S.E.2d 632, 633 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002) (stating that state has authority to transfer matter to criminal courts under
O.C.G.A. §15-11-28(b)(2)(A)).
126 See OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book (1999), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/
ojstatbb/html/qa088.html (noting that fourteen states and District of Columbia had
concurrent jurisdiction provisions that granted discretion to prosecutors to file certain
cases in either juvenile court or criminal court); see also Russell K. Van Vleet, Will the
Juvenile Court System Survive?: The Attack on Juvenile Justice, 564 ANNALS 203, 204-5
(1999) (stating that Arizona recently passed statute that gave prosecutors option of
automatically filing in criminal court); Juan Alberto Arteaga, Note, Juvenile (In)justice:
Congressional Attempts to Abrogate the Procedural Rights of Juvenile Defendants, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1054-55 (2002) (noting that Congress tried to pass bill that would
give prosecutors discretion to file juvenile cases in criminal court, but bill eventually died
in conference).
127 See Cynthia Conward, The Juvenile Justice System: Not Necessarily in the Best
Interests of Children, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 39, 53 (1998) (explaining that, "[iun states that
have concurrent jurisdiction statutes, while prosecutor's decision to try juvenile in
criminal court is subject to judicial review, it is not generally required to be based upon
detailed criteria, and is accorded significant amount of deference"); see also Martin &
Pruett, supra note 65, at 327 (noting that concurrent jurisdiction is shared between
juvenile court and criminal court over certain offenses); Lisette Blumhardt, Comment, In
the Best Interests of the Child: Juvenile Justice or Adult Retribution? 23 U. HAWAII L. REV.
341, 348 (2000) (stating that effort to give concurrent jurisdiction was measure to
"overhaul the juvenile justice system").
128 See, e.g., § Fla. Stat. §985.226 (2003) (providing that Florida has both legislative
waivers and direct file provisions). See generally Fla. Stat. § 985.227(1)(a) (stating that in
Florida a prosecutor can directly file in criminal court if defendant is fourteen or fifteen
years of age and charged with one of listed offenses, such as arson, sexual battery, or
robbery); Charles E. Frazier et al., Will the Juvenile Court System Survive?: Get-Tough
Juvenile Justice Reforms: The Florida Experience, 564 ANNALS 167, 168 (1999) (stating
that judicial waiver statutes formally in force in Florida were "cumbersome and time-
consuming").
129 See Klein, supra note 36, at 395-96 (arguing that prosecutorial waivers lack
appropriate standards, may be applied arbitrarily, and may allow prosecutors to abuse
their discretion); see also Arteaga, supra note 126, at 1062 (arguing that giving prosecutor
ability to make these decisions presents conflict of interest problem in deciding what
charges to bring); Brenda Gordon, Note, A Criminal's Justice or a Child's Injustice?
Trends in the Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and the Flaws in the Arizona
Response, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 223 (1999) (noting that prosecutors can abuse their
discretion by "overcharging" defendants in order to gain upper hand in plea bargains).
130 See Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27
CRIME. & JUST. 81, 92 (2000) (observing that prosecutors have "discretionary authority"' to
choose forum in which they wish to prosecute juvenile if juvenile meets set criteria); see
also Salekin et al., supra note 120, at 382 (stating that when charge is filed directly in
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The last type of waiver, known as reverse waiver or transfer
back, occurs after the juvenile has already been waived into
criminal court. 131 Here, the criminal court judge holds a hearing
to decide whether or not to waive the juvenile's jurisdiction back
to the juvenile court. 132 Reverse waivers have been set up
specifically to protect a juvenile against an inappropriate
waiver. 133 In states with prosecutorial waivers, reverse waivers
can serve as a check against abuse of discretion by
prosecutors.134
2. Proposal: Statutory Exclusion or Mandatory Judicial
Waiver
In order to have those juveniles meeting the set criteria
prosecuted in criminal court, there must be a waiver provision.
Due to differences amongst the various types of waivers, not all
waivers would effectively accomplish this goal. The waivers that
most effectively insure that individual juveniles are adjudicated
criminal court, no input is received from a judge); Kimberly S. May, Note, Shifting Away
From Rehabilitation: State v. Ladd's Equal Protection Challenge to Alaska's Automatic
Waiver Clause, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 367, 388 (1998) (stating that since system that allows
for prosecutorial waiver gives prosecutor total discretion, need for judicial waiver hearing
non-existent).
131 See Salekin et al., supra note 120, at 382 (observing that reverse transfers require
a hearing); Guttman, supra note 112, at 522 (noting that some cases can be "removed" to
family or juvenile courts from criminal courts); see also Paula R. Brummel, Doing Adult
Time for Juvenile Crime: When the Charge, Not the Conviction, Spells Prison for Kids, 16
LAw & INEQ. 541, 558 (1998) (relaying that reverse transfer provision is meant to be check
against decisions by prosecutors to excessively charge).
132 See Sabo, supra note 111, at 2445 (noting that if a prosecutor directly files charges
against a juvenile in criminal court, the criminal court judge may conduct a hearing to
decide whether or not to waive the juvenile's jurisdiction back to juvenile court); see also
Steven A. Drizin & Allison McGowen Keegan, The Aftermath of the Lionel Tate Case:
Abolishing the Use of the Felony-Murder Rule When the Defendant is a Teenager, 28 NOVA
L. REV. 467, 540-41 (2004) (indicating that reverse waiver hearings serve as a check
before prosecuting a juvenile as an adult); Slaten, supra note 112, at 838-39 (2003)
(describing the process of a reverse waiver hearing).
133 See Slaten, supra note 56, at 838 (noting objective of reverse waivers to avoid
"excessive prosecution"); see also Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241 (Del. 1994) (declaring that
unless there is an option for reverse waiver, statutory exclusion based on age violates due
process). But see Bishop, supra note 130, at 125 (arguing that shifting decision making
from juvenile court judge to criminal court judge does not make sense).
134 See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 24, at 694 (finding that reverse transfers are
important in jurisdictions with direct file or mandatory waiver provisions because reverse
transfers serve as a check against abuse of discretion); Slaten, supra note 56, at 838
(explaining purpose of reverse waivers to be "protective device" to counteract any
potential abuse of discretion or flaws in waiver process); see also Jennifer Taylor, Note,
California's Proposition 21: A Case of Juvenile Injustice, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 983, 989 (2002)
(noting courts' emphasis on importance of reverse waivers because they offset unfairness
that can result from statutory waivers).
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in the appropriate forum are either statutory exclusion or
mandatory judicial waiver. 135 Both of these waivers allow for the
least amount of discretion. 136 Discretionary judicial waivers and
prosecutorial waivers / direct file give either the judge or the
prosecutor too much discretion.137  As a result, there is
inconsistent adjudication of similar crimes. 138 Similarly situated
defendants are not given the same treatment. 139 On the other
hand, mandatory judicial waivers and statutory exclusions give
the judge and prosecutor virtually no discretion. 140 These two
types of waivers allow for the most consistent adjudication of
135 See Klein, supra note 36, at 390 (explaining that statutory exclusions work by
having legislature remove juvenile court's jurisdiction over certain defendants); see also
Marissa A. Savastana, Comment, Tattle-Telling on the United States: School Violence and
the International Blame Game, 21 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 649, 666 (2003) (noting
effectiveness of statutory exclusion in allowing prosecution of serious juvenile offendors as
adults); Chamberlin, supra note 121, at 400 (differentiating between different types of
judicial waivers, including those mandatory due to specific legislation).
136 See Klein, supra note 37, at 374 (acknowledging intent by legislatures to impose
statutory exclusion to remove judicial discretion); Guttman, supra note 112, at 521
(calling attention to lack of discretion available under statutory exclusion). Cf. Sabo,
supra note 111, at 2439 (noting that under prosecutorial waivers, prosecutor has broad
discretion as to court in which to file claim).
137 See Feld, supra note 56, at 478 (describing judicial waiver statutes as
"standardless grants of sentencing discretion"); see also Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note
24, at 668 (referring to Florida's direct file legislation as giving "unfettered" discretion to
prosecutors); Sara Raymond, Comment, From Playpens to Prisons: What the Gang
Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998 Does to California's Juvenile Justice
System and Reasons to Repeal It, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 233, 275 (2000) (raising
concern that prosecutorial waivers leave "ripe the possibility for unchecked abuse of
discretion").
138 See Feld, supra note 56, at 492 (describing subjective standards involved in
judicial waivers that make them impossible to administer without causing discriminatory
effect); Beth Wilbourn, Note, Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: National Trends and
the Inadequacy of the Texas Response. 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 633, 639 (1996) (noting
inconsistent and unfair judgments resulting from judicial waivers); see also Jensen, supra
note 121, at 192-93 (observing that a study of judicial waivers found youth in urban and
suburban areas were waived to criminal court more often and for more serious crimes
than rural youth).
139 See Jensen, supra note 121, at 194 (finding large amount of minority youths were
waived as opposed to non-minority juveniles);, see also Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper
Deschenes, Criminology: Determinants of Judicial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile
Offenders, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 314, 327 (1990) (describing discretionary
standards of judicial waivers and discovering a "high degree of variation in transfer
decisions"); Wilbourn, supra note 138, at 639 (remarking on criticism that judicial waivers
grant excessive discretion which thereby prevents consistency).
140 See Klein, supra note 37, at 374 (highlighting that purpose of statutory exclusion
is to limit discretion); see also Guttman, supra note 112, at 521 (explaining absence of
discretion for prosecutors and judges with respect to statutory exclusion due to limits set
by legislature on cases that can be brought in juvenile court); Thorson, supra note 120, at
854 (characterizing statutory exclusion as an "attempt to curb the discretion of juvenile
court judges").
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similar defendants charged with similar crimes.141 While both
types of waivers achieve similar results, there are differences in
both the mechanism of the waiver and the court of original
jurisdiction.142
a. Statutory Exclusion
Statutory exclusion provisions work by automatically excluding
certain juveniles from the juvenile court's original jurisdiction.143
Common provisions exclude certain juveniles by either their age
and / or type of offense with which the juvenile is charged.144 If
the juvenile meets the criteria, the prosecutor has no choice but
to file charges in the adult criminal court. 145 Under my proposal,
the statutory exclusion provision will work to exclude juveniles
age sixteen and older who are charged with one of the statutorily
defined sexual offenses from the juvenile justice system. It will
also keep those juveniles who are younger than sixteen or who
141 See Klein, supra note 37, at 391 (arguing that proponents of statutory exclusion
believe statutory exclusions bring "greater equity and predictability to the transfer
process"); Thorson, supra note 120, at 854 (noting that statutory exclusion provides for
more "consistent and predictable results" that are 'less arbitrary and discriminatory").
See generally Klein, supra note 37 (presenting effective benefits of statutory exclusion,
such as a means of attaining "retribution, deterrence, and selective incapacitation" and
"rational, easily administered method of deciding what youths need to be prosecuted as
adults").
142 See Conward, supra note 127, at 54 (describing various mechanisms that will
ultimately lead to same result. For instance, a juvenile offender may be statutorily
required to be tried in criminal court, or the decision may have been within discretion of
the judge); see also Slaten, supra note 56, at 834 n.117 (finding that juvenile court does
not have original jurisdiction in statutory exclusion cases while juvenile court does
initially have original jurisdiction in mandatory judicial waiver cases). See generally
Taylor, supra note 134 (suggesting that legislature sets guidelines for prosecutor to
determine court in which to file charge).
143 See Conward, supra note 127, at 52 (describing "automatic transfer" of certain
offenses to criminal court); Guttman, supra note 112, at 521 (explaining mandatory
exclusion of certain juveniles from juvenile court); see also Patricia Torbet, et. al., State
Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crimes, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, at 3 (1996) (defining statutory exclusion provisions).
144 See Reader, supra note 35, at 489 (discussing Ohio's recently adopted bill that
allows some discretion, but not with respect to statutory mandated age and offense); see
also Torbet, et al., supra note 143, at 3 (observing that New Hampshire and Wisconsin
lowered their upper age to sixteen, which effectively excludes all seventeen-year olds from
juvenile court's jurisdiction); Guttman, supra note 112, at 521 (describing age and offense
limitations set by statutory exclusion. For instance, legislatures often set an "upper age
limit" to cut off juvenile court jurisdiction.).
145 See Guttman, supra note 112, at 525 (stating that prosecutor has "no choice" if
offense meets requirements); Slaten, supra note 56, at 834-35 (explaining that case
involving juvenile accused of statutorily excluded offense must be filed in criminal court,
leaving prosecutor with no discretion); see also Jensen, supra note 121, at 182-83
(discussing Idaho's Legislative Statute which mandates that juveniles fitting specific age
and crime requirements automatically be sent to criminal court).
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are not charged with a serious offense in the juvenile justice
system. Finally, it leaves the prosecutor virtually no discretion.
b. Mandatory Judicial Waiver
Under mandatory judicial waivers, the juvenile court has
original jurisdiction over the defendants. 146 In a hearing, a
juvenile court judge decides whether or not to waive the
juvenile's jurisdiction. 147 A mandatory judicial exclusion sets out
certain criteria that, if met by the particular defendant, require a
waiver of jurisdiction.148 The judge has no discretion. 149 The
judge's job is simply to decide whether or not the juvenile meets
the statutory requirements. 150 Under my proposal, the only two
requirements that have to be met are age and type of offense.
The judge should not to take into account any other factors, such
as whether or not the juvenile has a prior record or if the crime
146 See Lisa Kline Arnett, Comment, Death at an Early Age: International Law
Arguments Against the Death Penalty for Juveniles, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 245, 247 n.18
(1988) (noting that judicial waiver occurs when juvenile court strips itself of its original
jurisdiction); see also Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 113, at 1000 (noting that, under
judicial waivers, juvenile courts have jurisdiction to transfer accused to adult criminal
courts); Slaten, supra note 56, at 832 (specifying that under mandatory judicial waivers,
juvenile courts have exclusive authority to waive jurisdiction to adult court, and that a
juvenile cannot be transferred to criminal court without juvenile court's approval).
147 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.226(3) (2003) (describing waiver hearing); see also
Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 113, at 1000-01 (describing how juvenile court judge could
decide whether to waive jurisdiction after are hearing to weight accused's rehabilitative
potential and his or her danger to society); Slaten, supra note 56, at 832 (explaining how a
hearing takes place where juvenile court judge decides whether the juvenile should be
prosecuted in criminal court).
148 See Salekin, et al., supra note 120, at 382 (clarifying that in a statutory exclusion,
mandated age and crime types are automatically outside juvenile court jurisdiction); see
also Sabo, supra note 111, at 2427-28 (stating that legislative waivers statutorily
excludes a juvenile from juvenile court jurisdiction due to juvenile's criteria of age and
offense); Slaten, supra note 56, at 833 (noting that certain mandatory waivers require
only the judge to find that probable causes exists to determine if juvenile committed crime
in the statute).
149 See Jensen, supra note 12.1, at 181 (discussing statutory waiver policy which
removes transfer decision from juvenile court judge); Sabo, supra note 111 at 2444-45
(explaining that this type of waiver is not discretionary and based solely on statutorily
defined criteria); Guttman, supra note 112, at 521 (stating that statutory exclusion leaves
no discretion to judges).
150 See Bishop, supra note 130, at 92 (explaining that juvenile court does not have
jurisdiction over juveniles that meet statutory criteria set out in mandatory waiver
provisions); see also Salekin, et al., supra note 120, at 382 (noting that statutory
exclusions leave juvenile court judges without input, other than determining whether
juvenile fits age and crime type requirements); Slaten, supra note 56, at 834 (specifying
that statutory exclusion removes juvenile court's jurisdiction over certain individuals who
meet certain age and offense characteristics).
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was against a person or property.151 If the juvenile is sixteen
years or older and charged with one of the statutorily defined
sexual offenses, then the judge must waive jurisdiction. If the
criteria are not met, then the juvenile will remain in juvenile
court.
B. Proper Court for Adjudication
1. Criminal Court vs. Juvenile Court
Whether a juvenile is prosecuted in juvenile court or in adult
criminal court is paramount to the juvenile. There are certain
significant differences between the two venues. First, juvenile
proceedings are generally closed and confidential, while criminal
proceedings are public.152 The names and addresses of juvenile
defendants are usually not printed by public media. 153
Additionally, juvenile records are generally sealed.154 In other
151 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966) (creating Kent factors
which help states decide whether to waive jurisdiction by including factors other than age
and type of offenses); see also Jensen, supra note 121, at 182-83 (discussing Idaho
Legislative Waiver Statute which automatically waives jurisdiction based only on age and
crime of offender); Sabo, supra note 111 at 2443-44 (citing that majority of thirty-seven
states' legislative waiver target solely offense and age of juvenile and does not consider
his or her individual circumstances).
152 See Brummer, supra note 31, at 789 (commenting that juvenile court system is
known for its confidentiality and secrecy); see also Klein, supra note 36, at 376 (explaining
that juvenile hearings were kept secret and files sealed to avoid criminal stigma);
Danielle R. Oddo, Note, Removing Confidentiality Protections and the "Get Tough"
Rhetoric: What Has Gone Wrong With the Juvenile Justice System?, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 105, 107 (1998) (distinguishing juvenile proceedings from adult criminal trials based
on general informality and exclusion of public).
153 The Supreme Court has ruled on the constitutionality of releasing juvenile's
names. In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court of Oklahoma, the Court struck down
a pretrial order that enjoined reporters who attended a juvenile proceeding from
publishing the name or photograph of the juvenile defendant involved in the proceeding.
Okla. Publ'g Co. v. District Ct. of Okla., 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977). In Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing, the Court struck down a West Virginia statute that imposed a fine and
imprisonment on any newspaper that published a juvenile defendant's name without first
obtaining the juvenile court's permission. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97,
104-05 (1979). The Court struck down the statute as an invalid prior restraint on speech
because the asserted interest of protecting a juvenile's anonymity was not sufficient
enough to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 104-05. In the Mepham hazing incident, The
Daily News and The Post both printed the names of the juvenile defendants. See
Calabrese, supra note 9, at 11. Other newspapers, such as The New York Times, did not
print their names. See generally Healy, supra note 7, at B6.
154 See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1967) (noting that while Court ultimately
decided case on procedural grounds, it did note that is was appropriate to keep juvenile
proceedings closed to public and to keep their records confidential); see also Feld, supra
note 56, at 477 (stating that records were always sealed in juvenile cases for youth's
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words, a juvenile who is prosecuted in juvenile court does not
have to deal with the embarrassment, shame, stigma, and lasting
consequences that often accompanies a public criminal trial.155
Given the traditional goal of rehabilitation, such practices make
sense.
While these considerations are important, the most significant
difference between the two courts lies in the sentences they can
give. Juvenile sentences differ greatly from adult sentences in
two key aspects: the length of the sentence and the nature of the
facility in which the sentence is served.' 56 First, juvenile
sentences generally cannot last beyond the juvenile court's
jurisdiction, which is generally at twenty-one years of age.1 57 As
a result, juvenile sentences can be considerably less than adult
sentences. 158 Second, juvenile sentences place the offenders in
benefit); Klein, supra note 36, at 376 (noting that, historically, juvenile records have been
sealed).
155 See Chamberlin, supra note 121, at 404 (reasoning that juvenile proceedings are
closed to public to protect juveniles "from being labeled as criminals"); see also Klein,
supra note 36, at 376 (rationalizing that records were kept under seal to avoid the stigma
of criminal conviction); Oddo, supra note 152, at 108 (quoting Justice Rehnquist in Smith
v. Daily Mail Publishing stating, "the prohibition of publication of a juvenile's name is
designed to protect the young person from the stigma of his conduct").
156 See Melli, supra note 54, at 378-80 (explaining differences between criminal and
juvenile systems); see also Brummer, supra note 31, at 791 (examining specialized
sentences and facilities for juvenile offenders); Chamberlin, supra note 121, at 394-95
(discussing theories and philosophies behind separating both justice systems).
157 See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 895 (1988) (citing that
juvenile court only authorizes confinement until offender has reached age of twenty-one
years and can last no longer than his or her twenty-first birthday); see also John B. Leete,
They Grow Up So Fast: When Juveniles Commit Adult Crimes: Treatment and
Rehabilitation or Hard Time: Is the Focus of Juvenile Justice Changing, 29 AKRON L. REV.
491, 504 (1996) (stating that juvenile courts have jurisdiction until age twenty-one); Cathi
J. Hunt, Note, Juvenile Sentencing: Effects of Recent Punitive Sentencing Legislation on
Juvenile Offenders and a Proposal for Sentencing in the Juvenile Court, 19 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 621, 631-32 (1999) (observing that many states have added statutes that
have extended criminal court's jurisdiction).
158 See Chin, supra note 62, at 298 (noting that juvenile justice system punishes an
offender less severely than if he were an adult because juvenile can not be held
accountable for his act); see also David Yellen, Forward: The Enduring Difference of
Youth, 47 KAN. L. REV. 995, 996 (1999) (stating that core rationale behind juvenile justice
system, that intellectual and psychological differences between children and adults,
warrant more lenient and supportive treatment for juvenile offenders). Compare N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 70.00(2) (Consol. 2004) with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05(2) (Consol. 2004)
(announcing requisite punishments for various grades of felonies for adults and
juveniles). But see Janet Ainsworth, Struggling for a Future: Juvenile Violence, Juvenile
Justice: Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition,
36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 941 n.65 (1995) (observing that juvenile sentences are not always
longer than adult sentences); Knipps, supra note 23, at 460 (citing New York study that
found only 4% of juvenile offenders arrested received adult sentences that would have
been longer than juvenile sentence, though vast majority of arrested juveniles received
either no sentence or were removed to Family Court).
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special juvenile facilities.159 Juvenile facilities are very different
from adult prisons.160 Adult prisons are more violent and less
safe than juvenile facilities.161 Juvenile facilities are set up with
the goal of rehabilitation, while adult prisons focus more on
punishment.162  These facilities have more rehabilitative
resources and programs than adult prisons have.163
159 See N.Y. CORRECT. § 71(1)(b) (Consol. 2004) (stating that "males under the age of
twenty-one at the time sentence is imposed shall not be received at the same correctional
facility as males who are over twenty-one at the time sentence is imposed"); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 508 (Consol. 2004) (creating separate facilities for juvenile offenders and describing
procedures and regulations of confinement); see also Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal
Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 232 (1998)
(describing various juvenile facilities, such as long term public facilities, privately
operated facilities, ranches, camps, boot camps, and training schools as well as percentage
of confinement in such facilities).
160 See Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Bloomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The
Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 323,
361 (1991) (noting that while juvenile facilities are not perfect rehabilitative and
therapeutic facilities we would like to think they are, they are less violent then adult
prisons); Thorson, supra note 120, at 862 (noting that juveniles housed in adult prisons do
not receive diet, discipline, exercise and educational needs that they would in a juvenile
facility); OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
BULLENTIN JUVENILES IN CORRECTIONS (June 2004) at http://www.ncjrs.org/html]
ojjdp/202885/pagel3.html (noting that generally, security is not as elaborate in juvenile
facilities as in adult prisons and that guiding principle is to place juvenile offenders in
least restrictive placement alternative).
161 See Feld, supra note 159, at 234 (conceding that despite their deplorable
conditions, juvenile facilities probably remain less harsh and abusive than most adult
prisons); see also Arteaga, supra note 126, at 1077 (youths incarcerated in adult prisons
are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted than those youths in juvenile facilities);
Lisa M. Flesch, Note, Juvenile Crime and Why Waiver is Not the Answer, 42 FAM. CT.
REV. 583, 590 (2004) (stating that adult prisons are much more violent than juvenile
correctional facilities).
162 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-32(3) (Michie 2003) (stating that one of purposes of
Juvenile Code is "to protect society more effectively by substituting for retributive
punishment, whenever possible, methods of offender rehabilitation and rehabilitative
restitution..."); Susan A. Burns, Comment, Is Ohio Juvenile Justice Still Serving Its
Purpose?, 29 AKRON L. REV. 335, 357-58 (1996) (stating that treatment in juvenile
facilities focus on rehabilitation while adult prisons focus on retribution and punishment);
Shari Del Carlo, Comment, Oregon Voters Get Tough on Juvenile Crime: One Strike and
Your Out!, 75 OR. L. REV. 1223, 1243 (1996) (stating that adult prisons highlight
punishment and retribution, while juvenile facilities focus on rehabilitation and
individualized treatment).
163 See Holly Beatty, Comment, Is the Trend to Expand Juvenile Transfer Statutes
Just an Easy Answer to a Complex Problem?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 979, 1014 (1995) (noting
that adult facilities lack educational and recreational programs whereas juvenile
correctional facilities have more meaningful programs that encourage personal growth);
Guttman, supra note 112, at 528 (noting that transfer of juvenile to an adult prison
destroys any chance of rehabilitation since the adult system has abdicated any
rehabilitative ideal). But see Feld, supra note 157, at 895 (arguing that while the general
public believes youth facilities to be "benign and therapeutic," harsh reality is that they
are often actually punitive in nature with widespread violence, aggression, and rape).
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2. Proposal: Forum Depends on Age of Offender and Nature
of Offense
The next question this proposal addresses is which forum is
proper for juvenile adjudication of sexual offenses. The answer to
that question should depend on both the age of the offender and
the nature of the offense. Under my proposal, juveniles who are
sixteen years and older, and who have been charged with a
statutorily defined sexual offense should be prosecuted in the
criminal court.164 Those juveniles who do not meet those two
criteria should remain in the juvenile court system.
C. Blended Sentencing
1. Overview of Blended Sentencing
Blended sentencing statutes first came into effect in the early
1990's.165 The concept of blended sentencing is an innovative way
to combine the original aims of the juvenile court system, namely
rehabilitation, with the retributive goals of punishment.166 There
are several different models, but what is common to all of them is
the ability to consider both juvenile and / or adult sentences. For
example, one model allows the judge to impose both a juvenile
164 See, e.g., N.Y.P.L. §§ 130.00 - 130.90 (defining sex offenses and requiring that in
certain offenses such as sodomy and rape in second degree, that defendant be at least
eighteen years old); see also People v. Burch, 120 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (App. Div. 1953)
(holding that rape in second degree is not an inferior degree of crime of rape in first
degree because legal and factual elements are different between two degrees, such as age
of defendant, an essential element). See generally 34 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 3904
(explaining that many statutes definining sex crimes are framed to incorporate the age of
perpetrator as an element and can in fact be criticial in determining the the degree of the
offense).
165 See Brummer, supra note 31, at 794 (noting that New Mexico enacted an extended
jurisdiction statue in 1995, shortly after Minnesota's enactment); Barry C. Feld, Violent
Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV.
965, 986-88 (1995) (discussing Minnesota's Juvenile Task Force's work in the early
1990's); Smallheer, supra note 26, at 278 (calling Minnesota's sentence prototype the
"pioneer" of blended sentencing provisions).
166 See Brummer, supra note 31, at 792 (arguing that Minnesota enacted blended
sentences to balance rehabilitative goals with increased public call for protection); see also
Christian Sullivan, Juvenile Delinquency in the Twenty-First Century: Is Blended
Sentencing the Middle Road Solution for Violent Kids?, 21 N. ILL U.L. REV. 483, 495
(2001) (arguing that blended sentencing furthers goals of rehabilitation, accountability,
and public protection); Chamberlin, supra note 121, at 409-10 (arguing that blended
sentences allow juvenile a chance to rehabilitate while still protecting public).
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sentence and an adult sentence. 167 At the end of the juvenile
sentence, the juvenile is reevaluated.168 If the juvenile is deemed
rehabilitated, then the judge will stay the adult sentence. 169 If
not, the juvenile then serves his adult sentence in an adult
correctional facility.170 There is no one set type of blended
sentencing statute. Other blended sentencing statutes only allow
the judge a choice of which type of sentence he or she wishes to
impose, i.e. either juvenile or adult.171 There are various models
that differ among the states. 172 The different models vary as to
167 See Sarah M. Cotton, Comment, When the Punishment Cannot Fit the Crime: The
Case for Reforming the Juvenile Justice System, 52 ARK L. REV. 563, 580-81 (1999)
(noting that, while types of sentences imposed and which judge imposes sentence varies
amongst five different blended sentence models, under one model, juvenile court is able to
impose both a juvenile and an adult sentence). See generally MINN STAT. §
260B.130(4)(a)(1-2) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604 (2003).
168 See Justice Ed Kinkeade, Appellate Juvenile Justice in Texas-It's a Crime! Or
Should Be, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 17, 42 (1999) (describing that prior to juvenile's eighteenth
birthday, court must hold hearing to determine whether to release offender or transfer
him to an adult facility); Torbet, et al., supra note 143, at 14 (noting that at age of 17.5
juvenile court must hold hearing to evaluate whether to release juvenile or commit him to
adult prison); Moore, supra note 58, at 134 (explaining that under Texas's blended
sentence statute, juvenile court reevaluates youth prior to his eighteenth birthday in
order to determine if he should be released from juvenile facilities, paroled, or sent to an
adult prison).
169 See Torbet, et al., supra note 143, at 14 (stating that juvenile in Texas could only
be released after hearing by committing juvenile court); Moore, supra note 58, at 133-4
(explaining that court has option to release juvenile on parole or commit him to an adult
correctional facility). See generally TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 61.079, .084 (2004)
(explaining options and procedures for transferring or releasing a juvenile offender).
170 See Audrey Dupont, Tenth Circuit Survey: Juvenile Law: The Eighth Amendment
Proportionality Analysis and Age and the Constitutionality of Using Juvenile
Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 255, 270 (2000) (observing
that stayed adult criminal sentence may be revoked); Kinkeade, supra note 168, at 42
(describing that prior to juvenile's eighteenth birthday, court must hold hearing to
determine whether to release offender or transfer him to adult facility); Smallheer, supra
note 26, at 276 (noting when juvenile can be transferred to an adult correctional facility
under blended sentencing scheme).
171 See Conward, supra note 127, at 64 n.170 (discussing court systems of New
Mexico and Florida, which both use exclusive blended sentencing, and enacted youthful
offender sanction that gives judge that authority over sentence); Torbet et al., supra note
143 at 12-14 (explaining that exclusive models of blended sentencing allow judge to
impose either an adult or juvenile sentence), see also NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ASSOCIATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVES IN THE
STATES [1994-19961 47 (1997) (noting that in Florida, judge's determination is made after
receiving a report from the Department of Corrections and Department of Juvenile
Justice).
172 See MELISSA SICKMUND & HOWARD N. SNYDER, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 108 (1999) (illustrating different kinds of blended
sentence options used by variety of states); see also Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.18
(1)(e)(m) (2003) (allowing criminal court judge to impose juvenile sentence, an adult
sentence, or blended sentence that would consist of both); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-20 (A)
(2004) (stating that "the court has the discretion to invoke either an adult sentence or
juvenile sanctions on a youthful offender").
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which venue the juvenile is prosecuted in and which judge
imposes the sentence. 173
There are five basic models of blended sentencing statutes. 174
The Juvenile-Exclusive model provides for the juvenile to be
prosecuted in juvenile court, but the juvenile judge can impose
either a juvenile sentence or an adult sentence. 175 The Juvenile-
Inclusive model allows for the juvenile judge to impose a
sentence involving both the juvenile and the adult correctional
facilities.176 Under the Juvenile-Contiguous Blend model, the
juvenile court can impose a sentence that lasts beyond the age of
the juvenile court's jurisdiction.177 The juvenile court later
determines if the remainder of the juvenile sanction should be
imposed in an adult correctional facility.17s The Criminal-
173 See Chamberlin, supra note 121, at 404, (noting that under Kansas's extended
jurisdiction statute, juvenile judge imposes sentence); Moore, supra note 58, at 131
(explaining that criminal exclusive model of sentencing gives authority of imposing
sentence to criminal court judge, while juvenile exclusive model gives authority to
juvenile court judge); see also Feld, supra note 159, at 241-43 (describing different venues
that impose blended sentences in states that have adopted one of models).
174 See Torbet, et al., supra note 143 at 13 (diagramming five different models of
blended sentencing statutes); see also Jeffrey A. Butts, Ojmarrh Mitchell, Brick by Brick:
Dismantling the Border between Juvenile and Adult Justice, in BOUNDARY CHANGES IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000 VOL. 2 188 (C.M. Friel ed.,
2000) (stating that various models of blended sentencing schemes achieved great deal of
popularity, spreading to 20 states); Cotton, supra note 167, at 580 (noting that five models
are either exclusive or inclusive).
175 See Brummer, supra note 31, at 795 (defining juvenile exclusive); see also N.M.
Stat. Ann. §32A-2-20 (2003) (determining that court has discretion to order juvenile or
adult sentence); Smallheer, supra note 26, at 280 (discussing choices available to juvenile
court judge under juvenile exclusive blending sentencing system).
176 See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-506 (2003) (stating that juvenile judge who finds a
juvenile delinquent must order a juvenile disposition, and suspend it pending court
review). See also see also Tanenhaus & Drizen, supra note 24, at 695 n.223 (describing
juvenile inclusive blended sentencing as a model that allows adult sentence to be imposed
if there is a parole violation or revocation); Cotton, supra note 167, at 580-81 (observing
that Connecticut uses this approach which allows for both juvenile and adult sentences).
177 See Moore, supra note 58, at 133-34 (noting that Texas determinate sentencing
scheme is most influential example of the juvenile contiguous blend sentencing system);
see also Smallheer, supra note 26, at 281 (observing that numerous states including
Massachusetts, Texas, South Carolina, and Rhode Island, use this approach); Connie
Hickman Tanner, Arkansas's Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction Act: The Balance of Offender
Rehabilitation and Accountability, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 647, 648 (2000)
(describing system used by Arkansas as a partial juvenile contiguous model with respect
to capital and first degree murder).
178 See Conward, supra note 127, at 64 n.170 (describing system in Massachusetts, in
which juvenile court makes decision, based on, but not limited to factors imposed by
statute); see also Smallheer, supra note 26, at 281 (charging juvenile court with duty of
deciding whether or not adult sentence should be stayed). See generally COORDINATING
COUNCIL ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
COMBATING VIOLENCE AND DELINQUENCY: THE NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE ACTION PLAN
28 (1996) (describing Texas statute, which gives juvenile court authority to impose a
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Exclusive and Criminal-Inclusive models are the same as their
juvenile counterparts, except that the juvenile is prosecuted in
the criminal court.179 It is then the criminal court judge who
imposes the sentence.18 0
2. Proposal: Criminal Inclusive Model of Blended Sentencing
Using either waiver provision, certain juveniles will be
adjudicated in the criminal court.181 The next issue that must be
determined is what will be the appropriate sentence. For these
juveniles, the criminal inclusive model of blended sentencing
should be applied. 8 2 The criminal court judge will have the
option either to impose a blended sentence or an adult sentence,
but he cannot impose solely a juvenile sentence. 183 If the judge
transfer from a juvenile facility to an adult facility and gives juvenile full due process and
procedural rights due to criminal defendant).
179 See Torbet, supra note 143, at 14 (detailing criminal exclusive and inclusive
models); Cassandra S. Shaffer, Comment, Inequality within the United States Sentencing
Guidelines: The Use of Sentences Given to Juveniles by Adult Criminal Court as Predicate
Offenses for the Career Offender Provision, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 176, 177
(2002) (explaining similarities between criminal and juvenile systems of
exclusive/inclusive sentencing); see also Comment, When the Punishment Cannot Fit the
Crime: The Case for Reforming the Juvenile Justice System, 52 ARK. L. REV. 563, 581
(arguing that exclusive and inclusive models of blended sentences differ in court that has
jurisdiction to make sentencing decisions).
180 See Torbet, supra note 143, at 14 (observing that under criminal exclusive model,
criminal court judge considers a set of statutorily defined factors to determine whether or
not a juvenile or adult sanction should be imposed); see also Smallheer, supra note 26, at
282-84 (explaining that criminal inclusive model, in contrast to criminal exclusive,
criminal court judge imposes a juvenile sentence, suspending adult sanctions unless
juvenile violates a condition of his juvenile sanction); Moore, supra note 58, at 134
(stating that both criminal inclusive and criminal exclusive models allow criminal court to
impose sanctions).
181 See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 113, at 1000-10 (discussing waiver provisions
and use of provisions with blended sentencing statutes); Torbet, supra note 143, at 5
(diagramming states which use a judicial or presumptive waiver); see also HOWARD N.
SNYDER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE TRANSFERS TO CRIMINAL COURT IN THE
1990'S: LESSONS LEARNED FROM FOUR STUDIES 1 (2000) (noting that majority of judicial
waivers in jurisdictions are based on juvenile's age and previous court history).
182 See Moore, supra note 58, at 135-36 (advocating inclusive models of blended
sentencing because of its effectiveness as a tool for rehabilitation); Torbet, supra note 143
at 14 (noting that only two states, Arkansas and Missouri, have this type of sentencing
provisions which allows criminal court to impose sanctions involving both juvenile and
adult correctional facilities). But see Smallheer supra note 26, at 286 (discussing criticism
of inclusive models of sentencing, namely that it will result in larger number of
incarcerated juveniles).
183 Compare Smallheer, supra note 26, at 280 (explaining that under juvenile
exclusive model, juvenile court has option to impose either a juvenile sentence or a
criminal sentence) with Torbet, supra note 143, at 13 (finding that juvenile exclusive and
criminal exclusive models of blended sentencing allow judge to impose only a juvenile
sentence). See Conward, supra note 127, at 64 n.170 (discussing juvenile contiguous
model, which gives judge option of issuing a sanction that may last beyond jurisdiction of
the juvenile court).
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imposes a blended sentence, it will include both a juvenile
sentence and an adult sentence. 184 The juvenile sentence will
have a determinative length, e.g. one year, within the juvenile
court's jurisdiction. For example, if the defendant is seventeen
years old, the juvenile sentence cannot last beyond his twenty
first birthday. Thus, a judge can sentence a seventeen year old to
two years in a juvenile facility. The juvenile sentence will not
simply end when the juvenile turns eighteen or twenty-one.
They will instead have a set sentence. When the juvenile part of
the sentence is up, there will be a hearing to reevaluate the
juvenile. 185 If the juvenile is deemed rehabilitated, then the adult
part of the sentence will be stayed. 186 If he or she is not
rehabilitated, then the juvenile will serve his adult sentence in
an adult correctional facility.i8 7
D. Why This Proposal is the Best Option
The combination of blended sentences and waiver options in
this proposal provides for the most adequate and effective way to
184 See Cotton, supra note 167, at 580 (explaining that "blended sentencing allows the
adult criminal judge or the juvenile judge to impose both a juvenile sentence and,
subsequently, an adult sentence"); cf. People v. Petty, 469 Mich. 108, 113 (Mich., 2003)
(clarifying that judge's have "option of imposing either a juvenile disposition, an adult
sentence, or a blended sentence, i.e., a delayed sentence pending defendant's performance
under the terms provided by a juvenile disposition); Brummer, supra note 31, at 821-22
(arguing that "The application of blended sentencing as an alternative for addressing
serious juvenile criminal conduct should be limited to juveniles who are of sufficient age
to be tried initially in adult criminal court.").
185 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (stating that "there is no place
in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without
ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement
of reasons"); Brummer, supra note 31, at 796 (explaining that under both inclusive
models, judge must monitor juvenile in order to decide whether to impose the adult
sentence or not); see also Cotton, supra note 167, at 567 (referring to Kent for proposition
that "a child being waived to adult criminal court was entitled to a hearing, consistent
with the notions of due process").
186 See Brummer, supra note 31, at 778 (explaining that under blended sentencing
guidelines "the adult sentence is stayed until the completion of the terms of the juvenile
disposition"); see also Smallheer, supra note 26, at 276 (suggesting that "typical blended
sentencing provisions enable a juvenile court judge to impose both a juvenile disposition
and a stayed adult criminal sentence when a juvenile offender is found guilty of a crime");
Moore, supra note 58, at 131 (noting that adult sentence will be stayed if juvenile
complies with sentence and has responded to rehabilitation).
187 See Brummer, supra note 31 at 818-19 (noting that, in Arkansas, if juvenile is not
amenable to rehabilitation, judge can use any alternative sentence available to court);
Smallheer, supra note 26, at 262 (describing Minnesota approach that punishes violators
of juvenile system with implementation of adult sentence); Moore, supra note 58, at 135
(observing that under Missouri's criminal exclusive model, if a juvenile violates conditions
of his sentence, then he can be transferred to adult sentence).
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deal with all juvenile sex offenders. By using waiver provisions
that provide for the least amount of discretion, we help
guarantee more consistent adjudications for similar crimes.
Juveniles who are under the age of sixteen are afforded the
complete benefits of the juvenile system while still having a full
opportunity to rehabilitate. 188 Those who are over sixteen and
have committed one of the statutorily defined offenses still have
the chance to benefit from the juvenile justice system through the
implication of blended sentences.iS9 Finally, juveniles whom the
system has failed by not rehabilitating them can be sent to adult
prisons to serve a stricter punishment for their crimes, along
with those juveniles who are simply not receptive to
rehabilitation.
In addition to the above waivers, blended sentencing is the
ideal sentencing option for juvenile sex offenders for numerous
reasons. Foremost, it retains the rehabilitative nature of the
juvenile court system while allowing for stricter punishments for
more serious crimes. Juveniles who are given blended sentences
have the access to rehabilitative programs in juvenile facilities
that they would not get if they were in adult prison. 190 Juvenile
188 See Mills, supra note 26, at 903 (noting that "The juvenile court system was
originally designed to rehabilitate juvenile offenders"); see also Smallheer, supra note 26,
at 261 (arguing that abandoning rehabilitation for younger children is a foolish proposal);
Cotton, supra note 167, at 588 (noting that at common law, "children ages seven to
fourteen were rebuttably presumed to be incapable of responsibility for their actions").188
See Mills, supra note 26, at 903 (noting that 'The juvenile court system was originally
designed to rehabilitate juvenile offenders"); see also Smallheer, supra note 26, at 261
(arguing that abandoning rehabilitation for younger children is a foolish proposal);
Cotton, supra note 167, at 588 (noting that at common law, "children ages seven to
fourteen were rebuttably presumed to be incapable of responsibility for their actions").
189 See Brummer, supra note 31, at 822 (concluding that using blended sentences
"protects society and at the same time creates incentives for rehabilitation"); see also
Smallheer, supra note 26, at 261 (explaining Minnesota blended sentence system in that
the convict receives benefits of longer, more intensive juvenile sentence along with threat
of adult sentence if there is a violation); Cotton, supra note 148, at 580 (explaining that
blended sentences are a way to "detain juveniles who may be too young for imprisonment
in adult jails at the time of the offense, but who have committed a crime that cannot and
does not warrant incarceration for only a few years").
190 But see Theresa Glennon, J.D., The Stuart Rome Lecture Knocking Against the
Rocks: Evaluating Institutional Practices and the African American Boy, 5 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 10, 32 (2002) (proposing that black youth "are much more likely to be
sent to public juvenile facilities, primarily locked local detention facilities or locked state
correctional facilities, which are generally more restrictive and more prison-like than
private facilities); Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So
Radical View of Holistic Representation of Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV.
288, 333 (2003) (arguing that conditions of today's juvenile facilities have not
substantially changed since 1970's when many facilities were found to encourage barbaric
policies such as regular beatings and isolation of inmates); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra
note 24, at 697 (arguing that blended sentences afford juveniles opportunity to
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facilities are also a lot safer than adult prisons.191 It can be very
dangerous to send a young teenager to adult prison.
Additionally, blended sentences serve as an incentive. More
specifically, the threat of an adult sentence serves as an incentive
for the juvenile to rehabilitate.192 If a juvenile knows that they
can be sent to adult prison, it will provide the juvenile with
added motivation to cooperate and take full advantage of the
rehabilitation programs that the juvenile facility offers. This will
also encourage good behavior from the juveniles while they are at
the juvenile facility, creating an incentive not to cause additional
problems.
It can be argued that while the threat of the adult sentence
serves as an incentive to rehabilitate, many juveniles will not
actually be rehabilitated. It is feasible that a juvenile will
behave while in the juvenile facility just so that they can be
released without actually being rehabilitated. A juvenile may
participate in the rehabilitative programs offered by the facility
with an eye towards release and not because they are trying to
rehabilitate. While this may be the case in some instances, it is
unlikely that this will always happen. We will have to rely on
our juvenile facilities to identify and handle such individuals.
Blended sentences also serve a deterrence function. First, the
threat of an adult sentence serves as an individual deterrent for
would-be juvenile offenders.193 Second, blended sentencing serves
rehabilitate, however, whether they are able to will depend on quality of facility they are
in. Unfortunately, many facilities do not have effective programs aimed at rehabilitating a
juvenile offender).
191 See Arteaga, supra note 126, at 1076-78 (discussing how juveniles in an adult
prison are more likely to experience sexual assault and violence as opposed to juvenile
facilities); see also Rose, supra note 119, at 987 (noting that "incarcerating juveniles in
adult prisons, surrounded by polished, career criminals, is certain to mold and develop the
juvenile offender's criminal skills and attitude to a greater extent than incarceration in
juvenile correctional facilities"); Ellie D. Shefi, Note, Waiving Goodbye: Incarcerating
Waived Juveniles in Adult Facilities Will Not Reduce Crime, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 653,
664 (Spring, 2003) (arguing that "adult correctional facilities simply are not equipped to
deal with the special needs of young offenders" due to adult correction system's focus on
punishment rather than rehabilitation).
192 See Brummer, supra note 31, at 779 (positing that blended sentences shift
responsibility to juvenile for their own rehabilitation); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note
24, at 695 (arguing that blended sentencing give juveniles both incentive and opportunity
to "earn their way out of the adult sentence"); see also Hunt, supra note 157, at 640
(observing that a youth can be transferred to criminal court after a juvenile hearing if he
poses a public safety threat).
193 See Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal
Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 ND J. L. ETHICS & PUB POLY 1, 28 (2002)
(finding that "there is a consistent pattern of higher rates of criminal offending among
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general deterrence goals. 194 Juveniles will know that if they
commit these injurious crimes, they are not necessarily merely
going to be sent to a juvenile facility until they are twenty one. 195
Finally, the imposition of an adult sentence will serve retributive
needs for stricter, more punitive sentences for more serious
crimes. 196
IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, there are flaws in our juvenile court system that
must be fixed. Namely, the court which prosecutes the juvenile
and the punishments being given are not always the best options.
By implementing a statutory exclusion or a mandatory judicial
waiver for certain sexual offenses committed by juveniles sixteen
years and older, we can assure that the juvenile is being
adjudicated in the proper forum. Young teenage sexual offenders
need to be given the means and the opportunity to rehabilitate,
and juvenile facilities can provide for such rehabilitation.
adolescents punished as adults compared to adolescents punished as juveniles"); see also
Chamberlin, supra note 121, at 404 n.119 (arguing that even a suspended adult sentence
will serve as a deterrent); Hunt, supra note 157, at 629 (noting that blended sentences
often lead to lengthier sentences which will serve deterrence goals).
194 But see David M. Altschuler, Ph.D., Tough and Smart Juvenile Incarceration:
Reintegrating Punishment, Deterrence and Rehabilitation, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
217, 219 (1994) (arguing that "while it may be desirable for punishment by incarceration
to have a deterrent impact, strictly speaking it need not do so to justify its use"); David 0.
Brink, Essay, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to
Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1566 (May, 2004) (noting
importance of considering deterrence and other forward thinking goals in sentencing, but
that these goals do not give "plausible answers to the questions whom to punish and how
much to punish"); Alison Marie Grinnel, Notes and Comments, Searching for a Solution:
The Future of New York's Juvenile Offender Law, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 635, 653
(Spring, 2000) (commenting that "although incarceration is a useful tool for incapacitating
the offender and, thereby protecting society by physically removing the defendant from
the community, it very rarely promotes deterrence").
195 See Smallheer, supra note 26, at 289 (concluding that blended sentences heighten
motivation of juvenile offender through threat of an adult sentence); Mary E. Spring,
Comment, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution: A New Approach to the Problem of
Juvenile Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1351,1376 (1998) (noting that
extended jurisdiction provisions will not allow chronic or serious juvenile offender to "scoff
at the system"). But see Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 113, at 1128 (arguing that "despite
the profound statutory reforms, no amount of juvenile or criminal justice legislative
tinkering with the boundaries of youth or adulthood will significantly reduce the amount
of crime in the community, offenders' probabilities of recidivism, or increase public
safety").
196 See Grinnel, supra note 194, at 657 (noting that "punishing juvenile offenders
through imprisonment satisfies society's need to hold juveniles accountable for their
actions"); see also Smallheer, supra note 26, at 289 (finding that blended sentences can
promote rehabilitation while satisfying need to ensure accountability of juvenile offender);
Hunt, supra note 157, at 669 (describing the public safety benefits of blended sentencing).
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Blended sentencing will further enhance the chances of
effectively treating juvenile sex offenders. Blended sentencing
will serve as an incentive for the juvenile to rehabilitate and a
deterrent for the individual to commit another offense, as well as
for potential future juvenile offenders. In cases where the
juvenile is not rehabilitated, the juvenile sex offender will serve a
stricter adult sentence. This will also serve to protect the public
from such offenders. In sum, this proposal adequately addresses
the needs for treatment and punishment of the juvenile sex
offender.
